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KEEPING THE FAITH: THE RIGHTS OF PARISHIONERS
IN CHURCH REORGANIZATIONS
Theresa J. Pulley Radwan*
Abstract: Faced with significant potential liability to victims of sexual abuse at the hands
of church personnel, four archdioceses and dioceses of the Roman Catholic Church have
filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. The bankruptcy proceedings present a multitude
of novel issues, including valuation of tort claims against the church and determination of the
property available to pay those claims. While each issue has the potential to affect
parishioners of the church, the issue of property ownership may have a particularly strong
effect. Under both canon law and state incorporation statutes, an archdiocese or diocese owns
all assets of its churches. Unless the diocese holds this property in trust for the benefit of its
parishes, a claim against the diocese or archdiocese may be satisfied with any property
located within any of its parishes, even if that property has no other connection to the claim.
Such property may be the only means for tort claimants to receive a substantial recovery for
their claims, but is also the only means for parishioners to fully practice their faith. This
Article considers whether parishioners have a procedural right to represent their interests in a
bankruptcy and concludes that parishioners have an interest in bankruptcy proceedings, but
that their interest is not sufficient to allow them automatic participation in the bankruptcy
proceedings. Rather, the courts will need to determine on a case-by-case basis whether the
diocese or archdiocese adequately represents the interests of parishioners within the
bankruptcy proceedings in order to determine the ability of parishioners to intervene.
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INTRODUCTION
On July 6, 2004, the Portland, Oregon Archdiocese of the Roman
Catholic Church filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection.' Nearly four
months later, the archdiocese of Tucson, Arizona did the same.2
1. Voluntary Petition, In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland, No. 04-37154 (Bankr. D.
Or. July 6, 2004) [hereinafter Portland Petition].
2. Voluntary Petition, In re Roman Catholic Church of the Diocese of Tucson, No. 04-04721
(Bankr. D. Ariz. Sept. 20, 2004) [hereinafter Tucson Petition].
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Spokane, Washington's diocese followed suit shortly thereafter.3 The
most recent filing involved the Diocese of Davenport, Iowa.4 Each
diocese 5 faces significant potential liability to victims of sexual abuse at
the hands of church personnel.6
Although the structure of a church bankruptcy proceeding resembles
that of other bankruptcy proceedings, the interests of those affected by
the bankruptcy can present unusual challenges. Chapter 11 bankruptcy
reorganization seeks to ensure a resolution which is fair and efficient to
all interested parties, allowing the debtor to reorganize while paying
3. Voluntary Petition, In re Catholic Bishop of Spokane, No. 04-08822 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. Dec.
6, 2004) [hereinafter Spokane Petition].
4. Voluntary Petition, In re Diocese of Davenport, No. 06-02229 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa Oct. 10,
2006) [hereinafter Davenport Petition].
5. Although there are distinctions between the two, for purposes of this Article, "diocese" will be
used to refer to either a diocese or an archdiocese.
6. Disclosure Statement Regarding Plan of Reorganization Dated, September 20, 2004, at 1, In re
Diocese of Tucson, No. 04-04721 (Sept. 20, 2004) [hereinafter Tucson Disclosure Statement];
Disclosure Statement Regarding Debtor's Plan of Reorganization at 5-8, In re Archbishop of
Portland, No. 04-37154 (Nov. 15, 2005) [hereinafter Portland Disclosure Statement]; Disclosure
Statement Regarding Plan of Reorganization Dated October 10, 2005, at 3, In re Bishop of Spokane,
No. 04-08822 (Oct. 10, 2005); Davenport Petition, supra note 4, at 4 (listing 20 largest creditors).
Before the filing of bankruptcy, more than 200 claims of abuse had been filed against the
Portland Archdiocese. Debtor's Motion for an Order (1) Fixing a Bar Date for Filing Tort Proofs of
Claim, and (2) Approving a Tort Proof of Claim Form, Bar Date Notices, Actual Notice Procedure,
and Media Notice Program at 5, In re Archbishop of Portland, No. 04-37154 (Aug. 18, 2004).
In the Portland Archdiocese bankruptcy, two lists of the twenty largest unsecured creditor claims
were filed-one list of the twenty largest non-tort claimants, and one list of the twenty largest tort
claimants. Portland Petition, supra note 1, at 7-16. The non-tort claimants' claims total $22,424,529
(the majority of which are claims against the church by its own bank for money lent to the church),
id. at 7-10; the tort claimants' claims total $341,425,000 (all listed as unliquidated, disputed
claims), id. at 13-16. Many of these claims of sexual abuse victims were paid before the filing of
bankruptcy. NewsHour with Jim Lehrer: Bankrupt Dioceses (PBS television broadcast Jan. 25,
2005) (transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/religion/jan-june05/diocesel-
25.html) (noting that fifty of 180 claims remained unpaid on the petition date).
With regard to the Spokane Diocese, one alleged victim's attorney questioned the need for
bankruptcy, stating that "[t]here have been no trials that have assessed any damages against the
Church. So what's the need for bankruptcy? How is the Church bankrupt, other than spiritually and
morally?" Id. (remarks of Don Brockett). Despite those initial reservations, at least some tort
victims have agreed to use the bankruptcy system as a means of resolving disputes with the
Church-seventy-five of the victims entered into a proposed settlement agreement providing for a
$46 million payment to the victims and an apology. Sarah Kershaw, Rare Kind of Scandal Accord
in Spokane Diocese, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2006, at A15.
A study released in 2004 indicated that the Catholic Church had spent $572 million on the sexual
abuse scandals. NewsHour with Jim Lehrer: Church in Crisis (PBS television broadcast Feb. 27,
2004) (transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/religion/jan-june04/church_02-
27.html).
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claims to its creditors.7 Although the goal of a successful reorganization
often conflicts with the goal of maximum payout to creditors, such
conflicts have been dealt with by the courts for many years.8 Church
bankruptcies, however, affect parishioners, who differ from the
individuals and entities involved in most other Chapter 11 bankruptcies.
9
Although similar to shareholders in that they have some (albeit
extremely limited) control, over the debtor'0 as well as some long-term
stake in the debtor, they differ in that they do not "own" the debtor nor
do they have a clear financial interest in it. Likewise, although they share
attributes with customers of a traditional company, they do not have the
contractual relationship a customer traditionally has with a business.
Finally, although many parishioners work to further the church mission,
most are not paid employees of the church."
Typical bankruptcies may not include parishioners, but church
bankruptcies strongly affect parishioners' interests, and bankruptcy cases
can and should take these interests into account. For instance, if the
churches, schools, and other assets of the church are sold to pay
creditors, the parishioners may be left unable to fully practice their faith.
Although one can have belief without buildings, for many Catholics, the
ability to fully practice their faith may require the ability to send their
children to religious schools, to gather for services in a building
dedicated to that purpose, or to have funds available to support church
projects. 12  Allowing parishioners to intervene in a bankruptcy
7. See N.L.R.B. v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 517 n.1 (1984).
8. See Jonathan C. Lipson, When Churches Fail: The Diocesan Debtor Dilemmas, 79 S. CAL. L.
REV. 363,365 (2006).
9. Id. (noting "struggle between two sets of comparatively innocent parties"-victims and
parishioners).
10. Like shareholders in a company, parishioners in a church frequently have the right to vote for
some church-related parishioner positions.
11. See Lipson, supra note 8, at 382, 399 (discussing concepts of shareholders and creditors in
conjunction with parishioners in church bankruptcies).
12. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Intervene at 2, Tort Claimants' Comm. v. Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Portland (In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland), Adv. Proc. No.
04-03292 (Bankr. D. Or. Feb. 3, 2005) [hereinafter Portland Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Intervene] ("Those in the parish communities ... use these parish properties for religious worship,
the baptism of their children, the education of their youth, the marriage of their young people and
the burial of their loved ones .... These places are integral to the exercise of religious practices that
benefit others."); see also James A. Hayes, Jr., A Legal Frontier of Church-State Relations in
Portland Diocese Chapter 11 Case, I No. 9 Andrews Bankr. Litig. Rep. 3 ("If these assets are
liquidated to satisfy the claims of abuse claimants, parishioners literally may be left without a house
in which to worship."); Lipson, supra note 8, at 370 (characterizing this dilemma as an "untenable
choice[]").
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proceeding provides them with an opportunity to assert those interests in
an attempt to prevent distribution of those assets needed to practice their
faith. On the other hand, sale of those assets would allow significantly
larger recoveries to those injured at the hands of Catholic clergy. 13 The
courts must therefore determine how parishioners fit into a bankruptcy
proceeding.
This Article addresses whether parishioners either have a right or
should be permitted to intervene in the bankruptcy proceedings of the
Roman Catholic dioceses. Different faiths, and even different churches
within the same faith, organize their churches differently which may
give rise to different rights in bankruptcy proceedings; this Article
considers only the structure of three of the Roman Catholic Churches
currently in bankruptcy. 14  It is important to note that the First
Amendment's religion clauses may dictate that parishioners be granted a
role (or at least have their interests represented) within the bankruptcy
proceedings.15  However, this Article considers only whether the
Of course, even if the various parishes, schools, and other properties are not deemed property of
the estate subject to liquidation to pay claims of creditors, the sale of some property may still be
necessary to support the costs of the bankruptcy proceeding itself. See, e.g., Joint Motion for Entry
of Order Approving Stipulation Regarding: (1) Disposition of Proceeds of Sale of Real Property
Located at 707 N. Cedar, Spokane, Washington, and (2) Deadline for Catholic Charities, Inc. to
Commence Action Regarding Interest in Sale Proceeds, In re The Catholic Bishop of Spokane, No.
04-08822 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. July 14, 2006) (seeking approval of agreement between Diocese and
Tort Claimants to allow sale of St. Ann's in order to pay for bankruptcy expenses).
13. See Jeff Wright, Asset Fight Has Florence Church in a Fix, THE REGISTER-GUARD, Feb. 1,
2005, at AI (noting that "the archdiocese's worth could grow by tenfold or more-up to perhaps
$500 million-if parish assets are included").
14. Indeed, the problems facing these archdioceses are not unique to the Catholic church. Ira C.
Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Sexual Misconduct and Ecclesiastical Immunity, 2004 BYU L. REV.
1789. Because the Davenport, Iowa bankruptcy filing occurred in 2006, see supra note 4, it has not
progressed to the point that the other bankruptcy filings have, and is not discussed in this Article.
The author anticipates that it will progress in a similar fashion to the first three bankruptcies, with
the benefit of the decisions already made in these three bankruptcy proceedings.
15. Lipson, supra note 8, at 365. Professor Lipson states "[l]f a diocese were effectively shut
down (because all assets were sold) over the objection of the diocese and parishioners, those
parishioners, and perhaps the bishop, may credibly claim that this use of the Bankruptcy Code
,substantially burdens' their exercise of religion." Professor Lipson further notes the ever-present
conflict between the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause, in that use of the
Bankruptcy Code may burden religious rights of parishioners by allowing federal law to govem
how the church operates, but failure to use the Code may grant an unconstitutional preference to
religion either if churches are excluded from certain provisions of the Code that apply to
bankruptcies filed by other types of entities, or if certain religions are exempt from requirements
that would force them to deviate from their foundational principles, while other churches are subject
to those same requirements. Id. at 366.
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Bankruptcy Code itself must or may allow parishioners a voice in the
proceedings separately from any reliance on constitutional provisions.
This Article argues that where parishioners' interests will not or may
not be adequately represented by their diocese in a bankruptcy case or
adversarial proceeding, courts must allow parishioners to intervene to
protect their interests. Part I discusses the status of the first three
Catholic Church bankruptcy proceedings-Portland, Spokane, and
Tucson. 16 Part II discusses the structure of the Roman Catholic Church
in the United States, including both the canon law organization and the
state law organization of the Church. Part III introduces the bankruptcy
system's rules of both mandatory and permissive intervention. Part IV
considers how parishioners fit into the bankruptcy system when their
diocese files for bankruptcy protection and examines the conflicting
roles presented to church leaders acting as debtors-in-possession in
representing the interests of both parishioners and creditors in a
bankruptcy proceeding. This Article concludes that the Bankruptcy Code
and Federal Rules of Bankruptcy and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
permit intervention by parishioners in bankruptcy proceedings when the
church-debtor is unwilling or unable to represent the interests of its
parishioners.
I. THE BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS
In Portland, 17 Spokane, 18 and Tucson,1 9 numerous individuals
claiming to have been sexually molested by church personnel have filed
civil suits against the church and its personnel. The potential liability
facing each diocese, as well as the costs of defending the abuse cases,
have led these dioceses to declare bankruptcy. A bankruptcy case
involves reaching a resolution between the debtor and its creditors.
Within a bankruptcy case there may be numerous adversary proceedings
to resolve individual issues. In each of the three cases discussed below,
there are various adversary proceedings involving property ownership
issues.
16. For a detailed analysis of the proceedings of each of these three bankruptcies, see Lipson,
supra note 8, at 372-77.
17. See infra notes 20-30.
18. See infra notes 31-36.
19. See infra notes 37-43.
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A. Portland, Oregon
The effect that the filing of a bankruptcy petition may have on
parishioners within a diocese can be seen in the Portland bankruptcy
case. In that bankruptcy, tort claimants (as the Tort Claimants
Committee) sought a declaratory judgment in an adversary proceeding
that property belonged to the Archdiocese, rather than to the individual
parishes. 21 The Archdiocese had listed many assets as being held in trust
for the benefit of its parishes and, therefore, not subject to the
bankruptcy.22 If the court agrees with the Archdiocese, a minimum of
assets would remain to distribute to aggrieved creditors including the tort
claimants, but parishes would retain churches, schools, and cash to
continue functioning.23 The parishioners of many of the affected parishes
organized as the Committee of Parishioners-Western Oregon.24 This
committee then sought to intervene in the Tort Claimants Committee's
adversary proceeding,25 and was granted the right to intervene in March
of 2005.26 However, the court ultimately sided with the Tort Claimants
Committee on the substantive issue of property ownership, holding that
the assets did not belong to the individual parishes. 27 The court declined
20. See Portland Memorandum in Support of Motion to Intervene, supra note 12, at 12 ("Few
proceedings have the potential to affect Catholic parishes more than does this one.").
21. Complaint (Declaratory Judgment re Property of the Estate), Tort Claimants Comm. v.
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland (In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland), Adv. Proc.
No. 04-03292 (Bankr. D. Or. Aug. 11, 2004) [hereinafter Portland Complaint].
22. Portland Complaint, supra note 21, at 3-4 (listing various bank accounts, tangible assets, and
realty).
23. The First Amendment implications of allowing a bankruptcy court to interfere in the property
decisions of a church have been debated. See, e.g., Patty Gerstenblith, Civil Court Resolution of
Property Disputes Among Religious Organizations, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 513 (1990); Marianne
Perciaccante, The Courts and Canon Law, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 171 (1996). This Article
does not refresh that debate, but rather assumes that a bankruptcy court may properly determine the
meaning of canon law as needed to resolve such debates.
24. Committee of Parishioners-Western Oregon, Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.parishionerscommittee.org/faq.htm (last visited Dec. 27, 2006). The court went on to
include all parishioners within the limits of the diocese as parties in the adversary proceeding. Steve
Woodward, Judge Widens Church Assets Case to All Parishioners, THE OREGONIAN, July 23, 2005,
at Al.
25. Motion to Intervene, Tort Claimants Comm. (In re Archbishop of Portland), Adv. Proc. No.
04-03292 (Feb. 3, 2005).
26. Order Granting Motion to Intervene, Tort Claimants Comm. (In re Archbishop of Portland),
Adv. Proc. No. 04-03292 (March 22, 2005).
27. Memorandum Opinion (Tort Claimant Committee's Third Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment) at 31, Tort Claimants Comm. (In re Archbishop of Portland), Adv. Proc. No. 04-03292
(Dec. 30, 2005).
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to decide whether the use of these particular assets would violate the
religious rights of the parishioners.28 The property ownership decision is
now on appeal. 29 The Tort Claimants Committee has filed a Disclosure
Statement and competing Plan of Reorganization proposing full payment
to all tort claimants using some of these assets, as well as future
income.3°
B. Spokane, Washington
Tort claimants in Spokane (as the Committee of Tort Litigants) also
filed adversary proceedings to determine ownership of property in the
Spokane bankruptcy proceeding. 3' The bankruptcy court granted partial
summary judgment in favor of the Committee of Tort Litigants 32 and the
diocese appealed.33 On appeal, the district court reversed and remanded,
citing the apparent failure of the bankruptcy court to consider numerous
affidavits from parishioners and priests regarding the intent of the parties
28. Id. at 30. The question of property ownership affects not only who receives the property at the
end of the bankruptcy litigation, but also whether the property can be used within the bankruptcy
litigation. The Committee of Parishioners argued that it should be permitted to use the assets to fund
its participation in the bankruptcy, stating that "the Committee of Tort Claimants seeks to impose a
Catch-22: it seeks to require the Committee of Parishioners to prevail on this ultimate issue
[property ownership] as a precondition to accessing the funds that are essential for the parishes to
prevail on the ultimate issue." Memorandum of Law in Support of Precautionary Motion Regarding
Use of Parish Donations at 2, In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland, No. 04-37154 (Bankr.
D. Or. Apr. 4, 2005).
29. Order Granting Motion for Leave to Appeal Docket No. 3197 (Case No. 04-314), Docket
Nos. 512, 513, and 514 (Case No. 04-3292), Tort Claimants Comm. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop
of Portland (In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland), No. 3:06cv00475 (filed Apr. 6, 2006).
Notice of Appeal by Certain Defendants of Order Granting Tort Claimants Committee's Second
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Tort Claimants Comm. (In re Archbishop of Portland), Adv.
Proc. No. 04-03292 (Feb. 27, 2006); see also Order Granting Tort Claimants Committee's Third
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Tort Claimants Comm. (In re Archbishop of Portland), Adv.
Proc. No. 04-03292 (Feb. 17, 2006) (declaring test property to be property of the estate).
30. Tort Claimants Committee's Disclosure Statement, Tort Claimants Comm. (In re Archbishop
of Portland), Adv. Proc. No. 04-03292 (Feb. 13, 2006).
31. Complaint for Declaratory Relief and Substantive Consolidation, Comm. of Tort Litigants v.
Catholic Diocese of Spokane (In re Catholic Bishop of Spokane), Adv. Proc. No. 05-80038 (Bankr.
E.D. Wash. Feb. 4, 2005) [hereinafter Spokane Complaint].
32. Memorandum Decision re: (1) Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; (2) Various
Motions to Dismiss; and (3) The Catholic Diocese of Spokane's Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment at 50, Comm. of Tort Litigants (In re Bishop of Spokane), Adv. Proc. No. 05-80038 (Aug.
26, 2006) (holding that "[t]he Disputed Real Property constitutes property of the estate").
33. Motion for Leave to Appeal & Notice of Appeal Transmittal to U.S. District Court, Comm. of
Tort Litigants (In re Bishop of Spokane), Adv. Proc. No. 05-80038 (Sept. 20, 2005).
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acquiring the property at issue.3 4 The district court found "abundant"
evidence "that the costs for the construction of Parish churches and
schools on the subject properties were provided by the individual
Parishes either through cash on hand or through loans obtained by the
Parish and solely paid for by the individual Parish and its members. 35
Therefore, the district court held that the bankruptcy court's summary
dismissal could not stand because an issue of material fact existed as to
the parishioners' interest in church property.36
C. Tucson, Arizona
As in the Portland and Spokane bankruptcy proceedings, the tort
claimants (as the Committee of Tort Litigants) in the Tucson bankruptcy
sought a judgment declaring that the diocese owned the property of the
various parishes, and that the property could be used to pay the claims of
creditors.37 The complaint was dismissed, with the court indicating that
the complaint "is not appropriate at this time" without offering further
explanation of its decision.38 The Archdiocese of Tucson and its parishes
attempted to avoid a costly dispute over insurability by entering into a
34. Memorandum Opinion and Order Remanding to Bankruptcy Court at 20-21, Comm. of Tort
Litigants v. Catholic Diocese of Spokane, No. 05-CV-274-JLQ (E.D. Wash. June 30, 2006). The
district court also added in dicta that the bankruptcy court could have used canon law in its
determination of the intent of the parties, but did not need to do so due to the overwhelming
evidence of intent from the parishioners and priests via the affidavits filed. Id. at 20.
35. Id. at 19.
36. The district court placed special emphasis on writings created before the litigation began:
The correspondence and documents regarding the negotiations and conveyance of title to the
real property of St. Aloysius Parish appear to be the most illuminating evidence on the issue of
the parties' actions and intent when Parish property in the Spokane Diocese was acquired and
improved .... Attached to the Affidavit of Father Barnett is a letter Bishop Charles A. White
of the Spokane Diocese wrote Father Fitzgerald, the Provincial of the Jesuit Order on
November 30, 1935 .... This letter, written some 70 years before any issue arose as to
ownership of Parish properties, clearly and unequivocally sets forth the role of the Bishop and
the Diocese of Spokane as it relates to formal title of Parish real properties being placed in the
name of the Diocese or the Bishop .... : "I would state further that in every case, I hold each
parish responsible for its own obligations. Even when the parish properties are held under the
title of the diocesan corporation, the Catholic Bishop of Spokane (the title of nearly all our
parish properties) this form of tenure does not change the fact that they are parish properties,
the diocesan corporation being a mere non-profit holding corporation which holds the various
parish properties in trust for the faithful of the respective parishes."
Id. at 8-9.
37. Complaint for Declaratory Relief and Substantive Consolidation, Comm. of Tort Litigants v.
Immaculate Conception Parish in Ajo (In re Roman Catholic Church of the Diocese of Tucson),
Adv. Proc. No. 05-00117 (Bankr. D. Ariz. Mar. 17, 2005) [hereinafter Tucson Complaint].
38. Order, Comm. of Tort Litigants (In re Diocese of Tucson), Adv. Proc. No., 05-00117 (Mar.
25, 2005).
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settlement agreement to determine how insurance proceeds would be
paid in the bankruptcy proceeding. 39 The Archdiocese and the parishes
agreed that the parishes would contribute two million dollars to the
reorganization proceeding and release any claims to insurance proceeds;
the tort claimants were not a party to the settlement agreement. 40 That
settlement was, however, included in the diocesan Plan of
Reorganization 41 which was, in turn, accepted by the tort claimants as a
class42 and confirmed by the court.
4 3
39. Debtor's Motion for Approval of Settlement Agreement with Parishes at 4, In re Roman
Catholic Church of the Diocese of Tucson, No. 04-04721 (Bankr. D. Ariz. July 11, 2005). Some of
the tort claimants expressed anger over the allocation of the settlement money in the Plan of
Reorganization:
By way of analogy, the Court is asked to conjure a man and his three sons (a gang) who have
planned and executed 12 armed bank robberies-these are dangerous serious criminals. The
police catch the father, and the prosecutors bring him to trial, where he is convicted but by fast
talking only returns some of the loot. And the argument of the sons, who were full participants
in the bank robberies, is that they will contribute some small change to the victims in exchange
for release of all liability to the people they have injured. No prosecutor on earth would agree
to it. So it is with the "gang of parishes." They either were actively engaged in the wrongdoing,
or worse, did nothing about it and covered it up for decades, leaving the victims to go through
hell on earth because of what they had done or failed to do.
Objection by 6 Class 10 Tort Claimants to Confirmation of Debtor's Third Amended and Restated
Plan of Reorganization at 6, Comm. of Tort Litigants (In re Diocese of Tucson), Adv. Proc. No. 05-
00117 (July 3, 2005). Of course, the analogy is weakened because not all of the settling parishes
were involved in the torts of the other parishes and their employees.
The Tucson Diocese's plan of reorganization proposes to create a Settlement Trust, out of which
all tort claims would be paid. Debtor's Third Amended and Restated Plan of Reorganization at 41-
43, 49-50, In re Diocese of Tucson, No. 04-04721 (Sept. 21, 2005) [hereinafter Tucson Plan of
Reorganization]. This trust would then pay the settled claim amounts of tort claimants. Id. at 42-43.
The tort claimants could, however, opt out of the Settlement Trust and enter the Litigation Trust
also created by the Plan. Id. at 49-50. All those in the Litigation Trust would litigate claims against
the church and, at the end of the litigation, be paid the lesser of: any judgment in the case, $425,000,
or a pro rata share of the Litigation Trust based on the final judgment amounts at trial. Id. The trusts
will be funded by a combination of cash on hand, cash received from insurance, and proceeds of
other actions. Id. at 52 (definition of "Fund").
40. Debtor's Motion for Approval of Settlement Agreement with Parishes at 4, In re Diocese of
Tucson, No. 04-04721 (July 11, 2005).
41. Lipson, supra note 8, at 376 (citing Sheryl Konmman, Diocese to Pay SIOM Upfront as Plan
OK'd, TUCSON CITIZEN, July 12, 2005, at 4B).
42. Ballot Report and Certification of Acceptances and Rejections of Chapter I I Plan for
Debtor's Third Amended and Restated Plan of Reorganization Dated May 25, 2005 at 5-6, In re
Diocese of Tucson, No. 04-04721 (July 8, 2005).
43. Order Confirming the Third Amended and Restated Plan of Reorganization Dated May 25,
2005, Proposed by the Roman Catholic Church of the Diocese of Tucson, In re Diocese of Tucson,
No. 04-04721 (Aug. 1, 2005); see also Lipson, supra note 8, at 367, 434-35 (indicating that
creditor's approval of the plan of reorganization may minimize Establishment Clause concerns).
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1I. THE STRUCTURE OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESES
AND ARCHDIOCESES
In both its state law structure and its canon law structure, the Roman
Catholic Church operates under the notion of individual parishes
collecting together as one diocese, with the bishop serving as the
administrator of the diocese and all assets located within it.44 When
those assets become part of a bankruptcy proceeding, however, their
ownership becomes critically important to the diocese, its creditors, and
all those who serve and are served by the diocese. To the extent that
these parties are interested in the proceedings and any potential sale or
distribution of assets, they need a mechanism for sharing their concerns
with the court.
This Part considers the organization of the Roman Catholic Church in
the United States under both canon law and state law. First, this Part
considers the internal structure of the Roman Catholic Church. Next, this
Part reviews the options for recognition of the diocese as an entity by the
state in which it lies. Finally, this Part considers the potential conflict
that may exist between the need to structure an entity under state law to
limit liability, and the need to structure the Roman Catholic Church
internally to ensure the hierarchical structure mandated by the doctrine
of the Church.
44. In a decision regarding the Archdiocese of Boston, the Vatican indicated it believes that the
diocese holds all assets for the benefit of parishes located within a diocese. Michael Paulson,
Vatican Stops Diocese in Taking Parish Assets, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 11, 2005, at Al. At the time
of the Vatican's decision, the issue of property ownership and trust was being considered in the
Spokane Bankruptcy and, indeed, was decided by the court within weeks of the Vatican's
statements. See Memorandum Decision re: (1) Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; (2)
Various Motions to Dismiss; and (3) The Catholic Diocese of Spokane's Cross-Motion for
Summary Judgment, Comm. of Tort Litigants v. Catholic Diocese of Spokane (In re Catholic
Bishop of Spokane), Adv. Proc. No. 05-80038 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. Aug. 26, 2005) [hereinafter
Spokane Memorandum Decision]. The Spokane bankruptcy court held that the property belonged to
the diocese, rather than to individual parishes. Id. at 50 ("[Ain express trust is created whereby the
Bishop, a natural person, holds legal title to the Disputed Real Property in trust for the benefit of the
debtor diocese which holds the beneficial interest. The Disputed Real Property constitutes property
of the estate."). This decision has been appealed to the U.S. District Court. Notice of Appeal of
Orders of Court Entered Aug. 26, 2005 and Docketed as Nos. 321, 322, 323, 324, Comm. of Tort
Litigants (In re Bishop of Spokane), Adv. Proc. No. 05-80038 (Sept. 6, 2005).
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A. Canon Law Organization45
The Roman Catholic Church is organized hierarchically. At the very
top of the hierarchy is the Pope, the highest bishop of the Catholic
Church.4 6 The Church is then divided into dioceses and archdioceses,
each led by a bishop or archbishop.47 Within an individual diocese lie
several parishes, which serve as the primary point of contact with the
church structure for most parishioners.48
Canon law 49 is the internal legal doctrine of the Roman Catholic
Church. It governs all members of the Church, 50 and developed from
church documents, Councils, and papal dictates.5 1 Canon law defines the
structure of the Church and divides the Church into dioceses, each under
the care of a bishop . The bishop is the sole representative of the
diocese.53 Generally, the diocesan division is territorial.5 4 Although there
45. The author recognizes that a number of constitutional issues regarding religious organizations
arise in this context, including the relationship between canon law and state law. For purposes of
this Article, the author assumes that canon law may be considered in determining certain aspects of
property ownership, such as donative intent when evaluating a claim that property is held in trust.
For an interesting article on the conflict between state laws and church autonomy in the sexual
abuse cases, see Perry Dane, "Omalous " Autonomy, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1715.
46. 1983 CODE c.331.
47. 1983 CODE c.336, 381, 393. Generally, dioceses are led by a bishop and archdioceses are led
by an archbishop, but there are exceptions to this rule.
48. 1983 CODE c.374, § 1.
49. The current Code of Canon Law became effective on January 25, 1983, during the papacy of
Pope John Paul II, after a long process of divining the Code. loannes Paulus PP. II, Apostolic
Constitution, Sacrae Disciplinae Leges, in CODE OF CANON LAW xi-xvi (Canon Law Soc'y of Am.
trans., Latin-English ed. 1983).
50. 1983 CODE C.l, 12.
51. See John A. Alesandro, General Introduction to THE CODE OF CANON LAW: A TEXT AND
COMMENTARY 1, 1-8 (James A. Coriden, Thomas J. Green, & Donald E. Heintschel eds., Paulist
Press 1985); see also THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF WORLD RELIGIONS 194 (John Bowker ed.
1997).
52. 1983 CODE c.369 ("A diocese is a portion of the people of God which is entrusted for pastoral
care to a bishop with the cooperation of the presbyterate, so that, adhering to its pastor and gathered
by him in the Holy Spirit through the gospel and the Eucharist, it constitutes a particular church in
which the one, holy, catholic and apostolic Church of Christ is truly present and operative."). The
Code of Canon Law also provides for "territorial prelature[s] or territorial abbac[ies]," "apostolic
vicariate[s] or apostolic prefecture[s]," and "apostolic administration" in situations where people are
not within a diocese. See 1983 CODE c.370, 371.
53. 1983 CODE c.393.
54. 1983 CODE c.372.
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is just one Church, each diocese operates as a separate "juridic person,"55
which is then further separated into individual parishes. 6 In many ways,
this further division into parish juridic persons mirrors a collection of
sister corporations controlled by the same parent.57
Although the bishop is responsible for the care of his diocese, he is
not its only officer. Each diocese must also have a finance council to
oversee the budget of the diocese,5 8 and a finance officer "to administer
the goods of the diocese." 59 Each diocese also has a pastoral council
charged with making recommendations about "pastoral works in the
diocese. 6 °
The structure of an individual parish within a diocese mirrors the
structure of the diocese as a whole. "A legitimately erected parish
possesses juridic personality by the law itself.",61 Parishioners generally
fall within an individual parish's jurisdiction based on the location of the
parishioners.62 Within each parish, a pastor is appointed by the bishop to
run the affairs of that parish.63 As with the bishop and the diocese, "[i]n
all juridic affairs the pastor represents the parish according to the norm
of law."64 This representation includes responsibility for parish
property.65 Like the diocese itself, each parish must have a finance
55. Canon law defines "juridic persons" as "subjects in canon law of obligations and rights which
correspond to their nature." 1983 CODE C.113, § 2. The Canons expand on that definition, noting
that juridic persons are established by law or decree to further "works of piety, of the apostolate, or
of charity, whether spiritual or temporal." 1983 CODE C. 114. As long as the juridic person continues
to operate, its existence is continual unless revoked. 1983 CODE c.120, § 1.
56. 1983 CODE c.373, 374.
57. Tucson Disclosure Statement, supra note 6, at 15 ("According to Canon Law, a 'juridic
person' is the equivalent of a corporation in civil law."); id. at 18 ("A juridic person is an artificial
person, distinct from all natural persons or material goods, constituted by competent ecclesiastical
authority for an apostolic purpose, with a capacity for continuous existence and with canonical
rights and duties like those of a natural person (e.g., to own property, enter into contracts, sue or be
sued)."); see also Lipson, supra note 8, at 399 (analogizing Catholic Church to parent corporation).
58. 1983 CODE c.492, 493.
59. 1983 CODE c.494.
60. 1983 CODE c.511.
61. 1983 CODE c.515, § 3; see also Tucson Disclosure Statement, supra note 6, at 19.
62. 1983 CODE c.518.
63. 1983 CODE C.515, § 1; see also Tucson Disclosure Statement, supra note 6, at 19. Exceptions
can be made to provide that a parish be run by someone other than a pastor in exceptional
circumstances. See 1983 CODE C.517, 520.
64. 1983 CODEc.532.
65. Id. (referring to 1983 CODE c.1281-1288).
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council.66 To the extent that the bishop deems it necessary, a pastoral
council may be created to assist the pastor with parish activities.67
Although the individual parishes operate as microcosms of the overall
diocese, the diocese itself controls many of the actions of each parish,
particularly with regard to financial matters. Each parish has a finance
council whose duty is merely to "aid the pastor in the administration of
parish goods" according to "norms issued by the diocesan bishop. 68
Each diocese also controls the sale or disposition of goods within the
parish by setting standards for when approval of the bishop and the
diocesan finance counsel is required for leasing and disposition of
church property.69 Although the Roman Catholic Church has internal
governance mechanisms, in order to enjoy the benefits of state law
incorporation, a diocese must also incorporate according to state law
rules.
B. State Law Organization
Various state law mechanisms exist for structuring a church, 70 but
many churches establish a corporate structure in order to enjoy the
benefits of incorporation.7 1 A primary benefit is that governance of the
66. 1983 CODE C.537.
67. 1983 CODE c.536.
68. 1983 CODE c.537. The parish finance council's function is limited compared to the diocese's
finance council. The parish finance council's role is more akin to that of the diocese's finance
officer.
69. 1983 CODE c.1292, 1297. Indeed, permission of the Pope may be required for particular
dispositions. 1983 CODE C. 1292, § 2. Further, the Pope is "the supreme administrator and steward of
all ecclesiastical goods." 1983 CODE c. 1273.
70. Patty Gerstenblith, Associational Structures of Religious Organizations, 1995 BYU L. REV.
439, 441 (listing "the charitable trust, the unincorporated association, the corporation sole, religious
corporations, and not-for-profit corporations" as possible organizational structures available to
churches, depending upon state of organization).
71. See id. at 444-65 (discussing the relative advantages and disadvantages of the various forms
of corporation organization and the disadvantages of failure to incorporate); Jill S. Manny,
Governance Issues for Non-Profit Religious Organizations, 40 CATH. LAW. 1, 1-2 (2000) ("The
most popular and perhaps the best way to effectively reduce risk is to separately incorporate the
parishes, the dioceses, and the various organizations that support the parishes and dioceses, such as
fund-raising entities. If properly structured, the incorporation of each organization will limit the
liability of the individual parishes and diocese by reducing their exposure to the actions and
negligence of parish employees, volunteers, and associated parties.").
For further discussion of state law incorporation, see generally I WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET
AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 5-14 (perm. ed., rev. vol.
1999).
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business is separate from the ownership of the business--directors and
officers run the corporation, while shareholders own the corporation and
enjoy the ultimate benefits of the corporation's profitability. This
structure allows the shareholders to limit their risk. Shareholders invest
in the company, but in most circumstances are only liable for that initial
investment. Wrongdoing by those running the company is not personally
attributable to the individual shareholders.72 Each of the Portland,
Tucson, and Spokane dioceses incorporated as a corporation sole,73 a
form which lacks traditional shareholders and traditional internal
corporate structures.
The corporation sole allows a church to incorporate the position of its
primary leader.74 In the dioceses of the Roman Catholic Church, that
leader is the bishop. Thus, the corporation sole allows incorporation of
the bishop's position. By incorporating the position of bishop, the
church maintains a constant state of incorporation; when a new bishop
replaces a deceased, retiring, or removed bishop, the new bishop
becomes the corporation.75 All assets of the diocese rest in the hands of
the bishop.76
In each of the Catholic Church bankruptcies, the diocese was
incorporated under state law. The individual parishes, however, were
not. The legal organization of the parishes and their dioceses therefore
raise significant issues regarding the ownership of parish property.7 7 As
72. But see infra note 221 (noting the potential problem of piercing the corporate veil).
73. Portland Disclosure Statement, supra note 6, at 15-16; Debtor's Plan of Reorganization at 1,
In re The Roman Catholic Church of the Diocese of Tucson, No. 04-04721, (Bankr. D. Ariz. Sept.
20, 2004) [hereinafter Tucson Debtor's Plan of Reorganization]; Spokane Petition, supra note 3. For
brevity's sake, this Article focuses on the issues with regard to the Portland, Tucson, and Spokane
dioceses. However, property issues arise for churches which are not Roman Catholic, and for
churches which are not organized as a corporation sole. See, e.g., Elizabeth Austin, Exodus.
Numbers. Judges. As Conservative Parishes Leave the Liberal Episcopal Church, Who Shall Inherit
the Real Estate?, LEG. AFF., May/June 2004, at 65 (noting that courts need to determine the
ownership rights of property involved in the Episcopalian church disagreements). Bankruptcy also
affects churches that are not Roman Catholic. See, e.g., Kim Nilsen, Christian School Shutters;
Bank Takes Control, TRIANGLE Bus. J., June 20, 2003, available at
http://triangle.bizjoumals.com/triangle/
stories/2003/06/23/story8.html (discussing bankruptcy of Love Christian Center Church).
74. Hayes, supra note 12, at 4; Gerstenblith, Associational Structures, supra note 70, at 454.
75. Hayes, supra note 12, at 4; Gerstenblith, Associational Structures, supra note 70, at 455.
76. Gerstenblith, Associational Structures, supra note 70, at 455. Roundtable Discussion:
Religious Organizations Filing for Bankruptcy, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 25, 39 (Spring 2005)
[hereinafter Roundtable Discussion].
77. See Portland Complaint, supra note 21; Tucson Complaint, supra note 37; Spokane
Complaint, supra note 31 (each seeking declaratory judgment that property is of the estate).
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noted in one of the bankruptcies, "[t]he closest analogous entity to a
Parish commonly recognized under [state] law is an unincorporated
association., 78 By analogy to businesses organized under state law,
churches are organized as one large corporation (the diocese), with
several subsidiaries, each operating as an unincorporated entity (the
parish). The "parent" corporation holds legal title to all property of the
unincorporated entities.79
Although each diocese may have chosen its state law structure for
different reasons, it seems likely that many incorporated to control
liability while still maintaining control of the ecclesiastic functions of
the church:
[T]he Archbishop desired that archdiocesan corporations be
structured civilly to protect against internal or external threat to
their Catholic autonomy.... [T]o preserve Catholic autonomy,
we sought a means to ensure that all archdiocesan corporations
understood, accepted, and advanced the doctrinal and moral
teaching of the Catholic Church in their governance,
management, administration, and activity.
80
This corporate structure reflects the Canon Law structure of the church,
in that it focuses on the diocese, rather than on individual parishes within
the diocese. In so doing, however, it appears that the churches did not
fully consider the possibility that such a corporate structure would
jeopardize the assets of individual parishes due to the actions of other
parishes.
81
78. Tucson Disclosure Statement, supra note 6, at 19.
79. See Tucson Disclosure Statement, supra note 6, at 19.
80. Reverend Edward L. Buelt & Charles Goldberg, Canon Law & Civil Law Interface: Diocesan
Corporations, 36 CATH. LAW. 69, 70 (1993) (discussing incorporation of the Archdiocese of
Denver). The authors provide some indication that such a structure was designed to allow the
archbishop to control situations such as the sexual abuse cases, noting that "in the event that an
employee's activities were contrary to the magisterium of the Church, [the Archbishop] wanted the
ability to intervene promptly." Id. at 77. The corporate structure itself also provided notice to
parishioners that the assets of an individual parish could be used by the diocese. Id. at 78 ("He also
wanted the faithful made aware that, under the Code of Canon Law, he could utilize funds of a
related nonprofit corporation for the benefit of the Archdiocese of Denver if necessary.").
81. See Roundtable Discussion, supra note 76, at 39-41.
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III. INTERVENTION IN BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS
The Bankruptcy Code expressly gives many parties the right to be
part of a bankruptcy proceeding.8 2 For parties not expressly given a right
to intervene, the courts are left to determine how traditional principles of
legal standing8 3 and the Bankruptcy Code provisions work together to
ensure fair representation of all necessary parties. Parishioners are not
automatically granted a right to intervene in a bankruptcy proceeding.
Thus, the courts must consider the special relationship of parishioners to
their church to determine if and when those parishioners should be
allowed to join bankruptcy proceedings.
Two primary policies conflict when courts determine whether to
allow a third party to intervene in a bankruptcy proceeding. On the one
hand, a fair and complete adjudication dictates allowing anyone who
may be impacted by a bankruptcy proceeding to participate8 4 On the
other hand, judicial efficiency leans in favor of limiting proceedings,
which are already inherently filled with multiple interests, to those most
affected by the bankruptcy. 5 Ultimately, the court must exercise its
82. 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b) (2000) (providing that "the debtor, the trustee, a creditors' committee, an
equity security holders' committee, a creditor, an equity security holder, or any indenture trustee
may raise and may appear and be heard on any issue in a case under this chapter").
83. In addition to the statutes governing participation in bankruptcy proceedings, the U.S.
Supreme Court has set forth a three-part test for determining whether a party has standing to be
heard in any proceeding. Those requirements are that: (1) the participant be harmed, (2) the harm is
the result of the challenged actions, and (3) that the requested relief will likely redress such harm.
Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464,
472 (1982). These requirements combine to require that the potential intervenor have a '"personal
stake in the outcome' of a case." In re Lewis, 273 B.R. 739, 742 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2001) (citing
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)). They further limit the bankruptcy court's ability to grant a
right to intervene, even when the statutory requirements are met. In re Delta Underground Storage
Co., 165 B.R. 596, 598 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1994). The Bankruptcy Code's intervention provisions
do not alter constitutional law principles of standing. In re James Wilson Assocs., 965 F.2d 160, 169
(7th Cir. 1992). The Lewis court, however, noted the difficulties of applying this standard in a
bankruptcy context:
Unlike a traditional two-party lawsuit, determining whether a party has standing in a
bankruptcy proceeding is a somewhat esoteric question. A bankruptcy proceeding is not about
just the interests of a plaintiff and a defendant whereby one party alleges an injury caused by
conduct of another party. A bankruptcy proceeding involves the rights and obligations of a
debtor, creditors, and trustee, among others. Moreover, bankruptcy involves the administration
of an estate's property and necessarily affects other parties' rights and interests vis-A-vis that
property.
In re Lewis, 273 B.R. at 742.
84. See Official Unsecured Creditors' Comm. v. Michaels (In re Main Motor Oil, Inc.), 689 F.2d
445, 457 (3d Cir. 1982) (discussing II U.S.C. § 1109(b) and its relationship to due process).
85. In re First Humanics Corp., 124 B.R. 87, 90-91 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1991) (citations omitted);
In re River Bend-Oxford Assocs., 114 B.R. 11l, 114-15 (Bankr. D. Md. 1990) (permitting partners
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discretion in determining whether to allow a non-named party to
intervene.86
A. Mandatory Versus Permissive Intervention
The Bankruptcy Code (Code) 87 and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure (FRBP) include a variety of sections regarding intervention in
a bankruptcy proceeding. Section 1109 of the Code states that a party-in-
interest must be allowed to intervene in any bankruptcy case;88 FRBP
2018 permits intervention for any interested party with cause to
intervene.89 Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) is
incorporated by reference into FRBP 7024 and provides for mandatory
intervention:
90
(1) when a statute of the United States confers an unconditional
right to intervene; or
(2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property
or transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant
is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical
matter impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect that
interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented
by existing parties[;] 9
and for permissive intervention:
(1) when a statute of the United States confers a conditional
right to intervene; or
of a partnership that was itself a limited partner of the debtor to file a plan of reorganization due to
unrepresented financial interests in the bankruptcy).
86. In re Addison Cmty. Hosp. Auth., 175 B.R. 646, 651 (Bankr. E,.D. Mich. 1994) (citing Benny
v. England, 791 F.2d 712 (9th Cir. 1986)); In re City of Bridgeport, 128 B.R. 686, 687 (Bankr. D.
Conn. 1991); Rollert Co. v. Charter Crude Oil Co., 50 B.R. 57, 64 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1985).
87. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1527.
88. 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b) ("A party in interest, including the debtor, the trustee, a creditors'
committee, an equity security holders' committee, a creditor, an equity security holder, or any
indenture trustee, may raise and may appear and be heard on any issue in a case under this
chapter.").
89. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2018(a) ("In a case under the Code, after hearing on such notice as the
court directs and for cause shown, the court may permit any interested entity to intervene generally
or with respect to any specified matter."). Though FRBP 2018 includes other intervention
provisions, those provisions apply specifically to the State Attorney General, labor unions, and
Chapter 9 cases, and thus would not be applicable herein.
90. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7024 ("Rule 24 F.R.Civ.P. applies in adversary proceedings.").
91. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a).
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(2) when an applicant's claim or defense and the main action
have a question of law or fact in common.92
The Advisory Committee Notes for FRBPs 7024 and 2018 indicate
that FRBP 7024 governs adversary proceedings and FRBP 2018 governs
"cases." 93 In analyzing a potential intervenor's rights, it is critical to
determine two things-first, is the potential intervenor seeking to
intervene in an adversary proceeding or a bankruptcy case; second, is the
potential intervenor arguing that intervention is mandatory or
permissive?
The interplay of section 1109, FRBP 7024 and FRBP 2018 can be
seen in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Mandatory and Permissive Intervention in Bankruptcy
Cases and Adversary Proceedings
Type of Proceeding
Type of Bankruptcy Case Adversary Proceeding
Intervention
Mandatory Party-in-interest under Unrepresented and
Intervention section 1109 significant interest in
property under FRBP
7024 (referencing FRCP
24(a))
Permissive Interested entity with Common question under
Intervention cause under FRBP FRBP 7024 (referencing
2018 FRCP 24(b))
The language of section 1109 mentions only bankruptcy cases, with
no mention of whether adversary proceedings are also included within
92. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b).
93. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2018, advisory committee's note ("This rule does not apply in adversary
proceedings. For intervention in adversary proceedings, see Rule 7024."); FED. R. BANKR. P. 7024,
advisory committee's note ("A person may seek to intervene in the case under the Code or in an
adversary proceeding relating to the case under the Code. Intervention in a case under the Code is
governed by Rule 2018 and intervention in an adversary proceeding is governed by this rule.").
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its reach. Courts have interpreted this language differently, with some
applying section 1109's mandatory intervention rules in adversary
proceedings, and others limiting section 1109 to cases alone.94 Those
courts that broaden section 1109's scope to include adversary
proceedings sometimes cite FRCP 24's statement that mandates
intervention when required by another statute.95 To find that section
1109, which expressly provides a right to be heard in a "case," also
applies to adversary proceedings, defies the separation which is
expressly provided for in the Advisory Notes to each of FRBPs 2018
and 7024. However, the Code provisions trump the FRBP provisions
(and, even more so, the Advisory Committee Notes to the FRBPs) in the
case of a conflict.96 Because a "case" is not defined in the Code, there
does not seem to be a conflict in the literal language of the provisions.
Furthermore, even if section 1109 does not apply to adversary
proceedings, the factors for determining "party-in-interest" status under
section 1109 mirror the considerations for mandatory intervention under
FRCP 24(a)(2) in that both consider whether the putative intervenor has
a substantial interest in the case sufficient to require intervention.
97
94. Compare Official Unsecured Creditors' Comm. v. Michaels (In re Marin Motor Oil, Inc.) 689
F.2d 445 (3d Cir. 1982) and Gleason v. Commonwealth Cont'l Health Care, 147 B.R. 813 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 1992) with 4 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR. & WILLIAM L. NORTON III, NORTON BANKRUPTCY
LAW AND PRACTICE 2d § 80:2 (2006) (citing Fuel Oil Supply & Terminaling v. Gulf Oil Corp., 762
F.2d 1283 (5th Cir. 1985)) and 4A Bankr. Service Law. Edition (West) § 42:377 (July 2005) (citing
In re 995 Fifth Ave. Assocs., L.P., 157 B.R. 942 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993) (no mandatory
intervention right in adversary proceedings)). See also Vermejo Park Corp. v. Kaiser Coal Corp. (In
re Kaiser Steel Corp.), 998 F.2d 783, 790 (10th Cir. 1993) ("Intervention in a bankruptcy case and
intervention in an adversary proceeding conducted in the bankruptcy case must be sought
separately."); Kenneth N. Klee & K. John Shaffer, Creditors' Committees Under Chapter II of the
Bankruptcy Code, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 995, 1046-47 (1993).
95. See, e.g., Gleason, 147 B.R. at 815.
96. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 1001, advisory committee's notes (noting that FRBPs are designed to
be consistent with the Code); Russell A. Eisenberg & Frances Gecker, Due Process and
Bankruptcy: A Contradiction in Terms?, 10 BANKR. DEV. J. 47, 51 (1993/1994). For an extensive
analysis of this issue, see Jennifer M. D'Angelo, Comment, If You Can't Beat Them, Join Them:
Inclusive Joinder and the Filtering ofArticle III Status into Bankruptcy Courts, 22 EMORY BANKR.
DEV. J. 603 (2006).
97. The Third Circuit has considered intervention by a creditor's committee, a group specifically
listed as a party-in-interest under section 1109. In re Main Motor Oil, Inc., 689 F.2d 445.
Ultimately, that court held that section 1109 creates an absolute right of intervention in adversary
proceedings as well as cases, focusing on very practical considerations: "[m]ost litigated matters in
a bankruptcy case are adversary proceedings." Id. at 450. To bar the creditor's committee "would
drastically restrict the rights of parties to appear and be heard." Id. Further, the court dismissed the
argument that such an interpretation of section 1109 would unduly burden adversary proceedings,
finding that "relatively few individuals would have enough interest in the outcome of an adversary
proceeding to seek to intervene." Id. at 453. In re Marin is often cited for this liberal interpretation
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B. Bankruptcy Cases Versus Adversary Proceedings
In order to determine the appropriate Code provision or Rule of
Procedure to use in determining a party's ability to intervene, it is first
necessary to determine whether the proceeding is an adversary
proceeding. Bankruptcies begin with the filing (either by the debtor or
by its creditors) of a bankruptcy petition98 under one of five chapters9 9 of
the Code. Chapter 11 deals with reorganization and prescribes the means
by which the debtor's assets may be distributed among its creditors.'0 0
Each of the church bankruptcies discussed herein was filed by the
archdiocese, diocese, or bishop under Chapter 11.101 Either the debtor
(known as the "debtor-in-possession")' or a trustee assigned by the
Bankruptcy Court runs the Chapter 11 bankruptcy. 10 3 The debtor-in-
possession or trustee is responsible for continuing operations of the
business (if applicable), creating a plan for the reorganization of the
debtor, 10 4 and executing that plan once confirmed. 0 5 A great deal of
negotiation and compromise goes into a successful Chapter 11
proceeding. Creditors who wish to be paid in a bankruptcy proceeding
generally file a proof of claim indicating their right to payment.'0 6 Once
approved, the claim is paid under the distribution scheme dictated by the
Code.107 This process, beginning with the filing of a petition and
of section 1109. See, e.g., Term Loan Holder Comm. v. Ozer Group, L.L.C. (In re Caldor Corp.)
303 F.3d 161, 164-65 (2d Cir. 2002); Phar-Mor, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 22 F.3d 1228, 1230
(3d Cir. 1994); In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d 1034, 1040 (3d Cir. 1985). But the In re Marin
decision pertained only to the definition of a "case," not of a "party-in-interest." See In re Marin,
689 F.2d at 450.
98. 11 U.S.C. §§ 301(a), 303(b) (2000).
99. Id. at §§ 701-784 (ch. 7), §§ 901-946 (ch. 9), §§ 1101-1174 (ch 11), §§ 1201-1231 (ch. 12),
§§ 1301-1330 (ch. 13).
100. Id. §§ 1101-1174(ch. 11).
101. Portland Petition, supra note 1, at 1; Tucson Petition, supra note 2, at 1; Spokane Petition,
supra note 3, at 1.
102. 11 U.S.C. § 1101(1).
103. Id. § 1106.
104. Id. § 1106(a)(5).
105. Id. § 1 106(a)(1) (referencing id. § 704(2), (5), (7)-(9)).
106. Id. § 501; see also S. REP. No. 95-989, at 61 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5787, 5847 (legislative history of 1978 Act stating "[i]n general, however, unless a claim is listed in
a . . .chapter 11 case and allowed as a result of the list, a proof of claim will be a prerequisite to
allowance for unsecured claims").
107. In Chapter 7 of the Code, the distribution scheme is outlined for all cases. II U.S.C. § 726.
In the remaining chapters, the distribution scheme is submitted for approval as part of a plan. Id.
§§ 941, 1123, 1222, 1322.
Washington Law Review Vol. 82:75, 2007
continuing through payment of claims in bankruptcy, is a "bankruptcy
case."
Adversary proceedings are a special type of proceeding within a
bankruptcy case. An adversary proceeding is, essentially, a trial within
the bankruptcy, 10 8 and usually begins with a complaint. It involves the
same procedural rules as litigation in other federal courts, including
complaints, answers, counter- and cross-claims, and discovery.' 0 9 Not
every matter in a bankruptcy case qualifies as an adversary proceeding;
the Code expressly dictates those matters which may be adversary." 0
The property ownership disputes in the Portland, Tucson, and Spokane
bankruptcies are adversary proceedings because they involve
proceedings to determine the interests of parties in property that may be
part of the estate."'
108. 6 NORTON & NORTON, supra note 94, § 138:4.
109. See generally FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001-7087.
110. FRBP 7001 identifies proceedings in bankruptcy that qualify as adversary proceedings,
including proceedings:
* to recover assets of the debtor or the estate, with some exceptions;
* to establish the existence, priority, or amount of a lien, except for liens on exempt property;
* to approve the sale of property jointly owned by the estate;
* to determine or oppose a discharge;
* to reverse confirmation of a reorganization plan;
* to determine the propriety of "injuncti[ve] or ... equitable relief" outside of a plan of
reorganization;
* to subordinate a claim outside of the plan of reorganization; and
* to transfer an action pending in another jurisdiction to the bankruptcy case's district.
The realm of non-adversary proceedings is not as clearly defined as that of adversary proceedings,
but in the author's experience includes the following:
" bankruptcy administration, including whether to file for bankruptcy and in which chapter,
hiring of bankruptcy professionals, opposition to appointment of a trustee, conversion of
the bankruptcy into another chapter of the Bankruptcy Code, and establishment of
committees;
" proceedings regarding property of the estate that are not adversary proceedings, including
adequate protection of creditors, termination of the automatic stay, disposition of property
of the estate, borrowing by the estate, continuation or termination of executory contracts;
" claims, including priority and payment on claims; and
" the plan of reorganization.
111. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001; Portland Complaint, supra note 21; Tucson Complaint, supra note
37; Spokane Complaint, supra note 31 (each complaint seeking declaratory judgment that property
is of the estate).
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C. Permissive and Mandatory Intervention in Bankruptcy Cases
Both the permissive and mandatory intervention standards in
bankruptcy cases indicate that a third party may or must be permitted to
intervene in cases when that party has an interest in the case. For a
parishioner, there are two possible means of intervention in a bankruptcy
case. The first, section 1109 of the Code, provides for mandatory
intervention. The other, FRBP 2018, provides for permissive
intervention. Both share a common standard for the court to consider-
whether the parishioners are sufficiently interested in the outcome of the
case to justify intervention of yet another party into a bankruptcy case.
Code section 1109 provides that "[a] party-in-interest, including' [12] the
debtor, the trustee, a creditors' committee, an equity security holders'
committee, a creditor, an equity security holder, or any indenture trustee,
may raise and may appear and be heard on any issue in a case under this
chapter."' 13 Thus, if a potential intervenor can establish that it is a
"party-in-interest" it must be permitted to intervene in the bankruptcy
case pursuant to section 1109.114 If a party cannot establish that it is a
"party-in-interest" its only other avenue for intervention it to establish
that it should be permitted to intervene in the case under FRBP 2018. 15
112. The Code expressly provides that variations of "include" do not restrict the list to those
mentioned. 11 U.S.C. § 102(3).
113. Id. § 1109(b) (emphasis added).
114. But see Kowal v. Malkemus (In re Thompson) 965 F.2d 1136, 1141-42 (lst Cir. 1992)
(indicating that even section 1109 does not provide an absolute right to intervene in every matter,
leaving some discretion to the courts to determine whether intervention is necessary).
115. The Code generally provides substantive provisions, while the FRBPs and FRCPs provide
procedural guides. Although the "may" and "must" provisions of FRBP 2018 and section 1109
indicate that these provisions are separate, at least one court has held that FRBP 2018 simply
provides the mechanism for implementing section 1109 of the Code. Hasso v. Mozsgai (In re La
Sierra Fin. Servs., Inc.) 290 B.R. 718, 728 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2002). If so, there is no distinction
between a "party-in-interest" and an "interested party," and the "causation" required under FRBP
2018 would simply be the interest that is sufficient to create "party-in-interest" status. See Hasso (In
re La Sierra Fin. Servs.), 290 B.R. at 728. Combining these terms, however, creates some
interpretative problems. FRBP 2018 governs permissive intervention. But one of the requirements
of FRBP 2018, interest of the party, leads to mandatory intervention under section 1109. If "party-
in-interest" and "interested party" are equivalents, and FRBP 2018 just provides the implementation
procedures for section 1109, it seems unnecessary for FRBP 2018 to add the causation requirement
or to permit judicial discretion regarding intervention. One court has explained the intersection of
section 1109 and FRBP 2018 as follows: "Rule 2018(a) provides for intervention by entities not
otherwise having a right to participate in the bankruptcy case under section 1109 or other
provisions." In re Addison Cmty. Hosp. Auth., 175 B.R. 646, 650 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1994)
(citations omitted).
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Although section 1109 and other sections of the Code provide rights
for a party-in-interest, the Code itself does not define what constitutes a
party-in-interest. 16 Parishioners are not listed as parties-in-interest.
However, the list in section 1109 is not exclusive,' 17 and the term "party-
in-interest" is never defined within the Code. Case law dictates that the
phrase "party-in-interest" must be construed liberally," 8 ensuring that
those with a sufficient interest in the proceeding are given an
opportunity to participate. 1 9 In a business reorganization, a multitude of
parties may have an interest in the proceeding:
The workout tl20 3 will be cause for many parties who have some
relationship to or depend on the debtor's business to be
concerned and watchful as the workout unfolds. Employees,
retirees, shareholders, lessees, mass tort claimants, franchisees,
franchisers, labor unions, government authorities, customers,
distributors, and others will react to the possible termination,
sale, modification, or relocation of the debtor's business. While
many of these interested parties may not appear to be major
players in the workout-lacking numbers, organization, or
clout-they may take on great importance as new directions
develop during the workout. The major players should not be
indifferent to the effect of the workout on these diverse parties.
The legitimate concerns of such parties should be addressed;
they will be needed to vote for, support, and perhaps implement
a reorganization plan.
21
116. This vagueness is somewhat surprising, given the importance of party-in-interest status.
Being a party-in-interest allows a party to play a significant advisory role in the bankruptcy
proceeding. See In re Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H. (Pub. Serv. 1), 88 B.R. 546, 551 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1988)
(listing some of the actions that a party-in-interest may take in a bankruptcy proceeding). For
example, parties in interest may request relief from or extension of the automatic stay imposed by
the Bankruptcy Court (11 U.S.C. §§ 362(c)(3)(B), 362(d)(1)); seek appointment of a trustee (id.
§§ 303(g), 1104(a)); or file a competing plan of reorganization (id. § 1121(c)).
117. 11 U.S.C. § 102(3); see also 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1109.02[1] (15th ed. 1987).
118. In re Wells, 227 B.R. 553, 559 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1998).
119. Numerous cases have held that the term "party-in-interest" must be construed broadly to
allow those with an interest in the proceedings to participate. See, e.g., In re Addison, 175 B.R. at
650; In re Farley, Inc., 156 B.R. 203, 208 (N.D. 111. 1993) (citing Unsecured Creditors Comm. v.
Marepcon Fin. Corp. (In re Bumper Sales, Inc.) 907 F.2d 1430, 1433 (4th Cir. 1990)); In re Pub.
Serv., 88 B.R. at 550; In re Citizens Loan & Thrift Co., 7 B.R. 88, 90 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1980).
120. A "workout" typically involves negotiating agreements outside of the bankruptcy system to
attempt to prevent the debtor from needing to file for bankruptcy protection. It can involve many of
the same considerations as a bankruptcy proceeding, including renegotiation of indebtedness
amounts and payment schedules. 9 Am. JUR. 2d, Bankruptcy § 35 (2006).
121. DONALD LEE ROME, BUSINESS WORKOUTS MANUAL § 1:21 (Nov. 2002).
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Although a party can obtain party-in-interest status based on a
financial interest in the bankruptcy proceeding, 122 neither the statute nor
the majority of case law requires that the interest of a putative party-in-
interest be financial. 123 Indeed, many courts recognize other interests that
may qualify for party-in-interest status, including "practical stake[s],' 124
"legally protected interest[s],' 125 or interests of "those who will be
impacted in any significant way." 126 However, the alleged damage to the
potential party-in-interest must be tangible, 127  even if somewhat
speculative. 1
28
122. See In re Hathaway Ranch P'ship, 116 BR. 208, 213 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1990) (finding that
limited partner of the debtor's general partner had sufficient potential for gain or loss based on
debtor's bankruptcy to be a party-in-interest); In re FRG, Inc., 107 B.R. 461, 467-68 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding that a creditor's recovery in a related bankruptcy proceeding could be
substantially affected by the bankruptcy at issue, and thus the creditor satisfied requirements for
party-in-interest status); see also Doral Ctr., Inc. v. Ionosphere Clubs, Inc. (In re Ionosphere Clubs,
Inc.), 208 B.R. 812, 815 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997) (granting party-in-interest status to pre-petition
owner of right of first refusal on property); In re Chandler Airpark Joint Venture 1, 163 B.R. 566,
568-69 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1992) (finding that party granted deed from debtor, despite contingent
nature of deed, has financial interest and is thus party-in-interest); Vieland v. First Fed. Sav. Bank,
41 B.R. 134, 139 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984) (granting party-in-interest status to post-petition bidder
on property to seek relief from automatic stay preventing sale of property). Where there is no direct
financial interest, party-in-interest status has been denied. See In re Athos Steel and Aluminum,
Inc., 69 B.R. 515, 519 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (noting that bankruptcy would "have no direct effect
on the objector's pecuniary interests" and the objector was therefore not a party-in-interest).
Furthermore, not every financial interest is sufficient to render one a party-in-interest. See, e.g., In
re Crescent Mfg. Co., 122 B.R. 979, 981 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990) (denying party-in-interest status
to post-petition bidder on property of debtor).
123. See In re Wells, 227 B.R. at 559 ("Unfortunately, courts have not established a general test
to determine what constitutes the requisite stake .... '[we] know a sufficient stake when [we] see
it."' (citing Peachtree Lane Assocs., Ltd. v. Granader (In re Peachtree Lane Assocs.), 188 B.R. 815,
825, n.8 (N.D. Ill. 1995) and quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
concurring))); Portland Memorandum in Support of Motion to Intervene, supra note 12, at 4-5.
124. In re Wells, 227 B.R. at 559.
125. Id. However, in Wells, the court went on to find that the party-in-interest had "a direct legal
and pecuniary interest" in the bankruptcy proceeding. Id. at 560.
126. In re Cowan, 235 B.R. 912, 915 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1999) (citing In re Johns-Manville Corp.,
36 B.R. 743, 754 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984)).
127. In re Athos Steel, 69 B.R. at 519-20 (1987) (finding that brother whose reputation might be
injured due to association with debtor corporation could not qualify as party-in-interest).
128. In In re First Interregional Equity Corp., the court determined that a trustee in the
bankruptcy of a related entity constituted a party-in-interest. 218 B.R. 731, 739 (Bankr. D.N.J.
1997). Even though the extent of the financial effect on the Trustee's estate was not certain, the
court found that the possibility of significant financial effect sufficed to warrant intervention. Id. at
738-39 & n.5. The Third Circuit has even granted party-in-interest status to future claimants not yet
identified in an asbestos-manufacturing company's bankruptcy proceeding despite the uncertainty
of their future claims or the impact that the bankruptcy would have on those claims. In re Amatex
Corp., 755 F.2d 1034, 1042 (3d Cir. 1985).
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The confusion over the elements required for party-in-interest status
is evident even in a leading treatise on bankruptcy law, which notes that
"anyone holding a direct financial stake in the outcome of the case
should have an opportunity... to participate in the adjudication of any
issue that may ultimately shape the disposition of his or her interest.'
' 29
In a later section, however, the same treatise notes that section 1109's
list of parties-in-interest is not exclusive, and that any individual with a
"significant legal" interest in the case may qualify.130 Finally, in
discussing the rationale for the statute, the treatise explains that a
"person directly affected by" the bankruptcy may present arguments.13l
It is certainly possible for a person or entity to be affected by a
bankruptcy without a legal or financial interest in the case. The
confusion grows when one considers that section 1109's mandatory
intervention standard applies to "parties-in-interest," while FRBP 2018's
permissive intervention standard applies to "interested parties." If
interested parties and parties-in-interest are synonymous, FRBP 2018 is
rendered superfluous because the parties would already receive
mandatory intervention rights under section 1109. Yet there is no
guidance as to how these practically identical terms differ. In order to
determine how parishioners might fit into this bankruptcy scheme, some
guidance may be obtained by looking at cases involving potential
parties-in-interest or interested parties that are neither creditors nor
persons with a contractual financial interest in the bankruptcy
proceeding, and who reflect some of the same issues as parishioners-
specifically, customers and putative property owners.
1. Customers
Customers hold a unique position with regard to a business
undergoing bankruptcy proceedings in that the customers' interests in
the bankrupt debtor may not be entirely clear. They are a necessary part
of any business and typically the primary focus of the business. They
may also be creditors of the business, for example if they have paid for a
129. 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1109.011] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 15th
ed. rev. 2005) (emphasis added) (citing Doral Ctr., Inc. v. Ionosphere Clubs, Inc. (In re Ionosphere
Clubs, Inc.) 208 B.R. 812, 814 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997)).
130. Id. 1109.02[1] (emphasis added) (collecting cases).
131. See id. 1109.04[21[b] (emphasis added) (citing In re Boomgarden, 780 F.2d 657 (7th Cir.
1985); Official Unsecured Creditors' Comm. v. Michaels (In re Matin Motor Oil, Inc.), 689 F.2d
445 (3d Cir. 1982)).
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product that has not yet been delivered. But when a customer does not
have a specific claim against the company, and is thus not a creditor of
the debtor, what rights does it have in bankruptcy? The role of customers
in one public utility's bankruptcy provides a close, though imperfect,
analogy to the interests of parishioners in a church bankruptcy.
The New Hampshire Bankruptcy Court faced this issue in the context
of permissive intervention in In re Public Service Co. of New Hampshire
(Public Service 1),132 in which environmental groups 133 moved to
intervene in a public utility company bankruptcy based on their
members' status as customers. In addition to the customers, Public
Service I involved a number of other parties seeking to intervene,
including attorneys general as consumer representatives, a business
association, and citizen groups. 134 The court first considered the effect of
FRBP 2018, particularly its requirement that the party demonstrate
"cause" to participate in the proceeding.' 35 Quoting Collier on
Bankruptcy, the court held that cause requires the party to possess "an
economic or similar interest" in the bankruptcy proceeding.136 For the
New Hampshire attorney general, the result was simple because the
Code mandated the state as a party in interest.1 37 For all other parties, the
court refused to find an ability to intervene generally, while recognizing
that in individual matters within the bankruptcy proceeding, parties may
be interested and able to intervene.138 The Court then continued by
determining that two entities-the New Hampshire Office of the
Consumer Advocate (Consumer Advocate) and the Business and
Industry Association (BIA)-would be granted limited party-in-interest
status in matters where they could assist the court with "their respective
132. 88 B.R. 546 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1988).
133. See In re Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H. (Pub. Serv. 11), 90 B.R. 575, 579 (Bankr. N. H. 1988)
(related proceeding identifying the groups as environmental groups).
134. In re Pub. Serv. (Pub. Serv. 1), 88 B.R. at 548-49. A total of three customer ratepayer groups
moved to intervene: The Citizens Within the 10 Mile Radius, Inc., the Seacoast Anti-Pollution
League, and the Campaign for Ratepayers' Rights.
135. Id. at 551-52.
136. Id. at 551 (quoting 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 118 2018.03[3]).
137. Id. at 555 (citing II USC 1129(a)(6)). Though not dispositive of the case, the court noted
that New Hampshire also had an economic interest in the case as a creditor, id. at 555 n. 3, and due
to its role as public utility regulator, was a party-in-interest "in every practical sense." Id. at 555.
138. Id. at 555 ("[T]he path of wisdom is to defer deciding these matters until they can be
presented in more specific contexts").
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viewpoints and special expertise."'' 39  These entities had routinely
assisted the New Hampshire Public Utility Commission by bringing
forth viewpoints of utility customers; "° as a result, the knowledge those
entities acquired could be useful to the bankruptcy court. 41 Although
stopping short of granting general party-in-interest status, the Court
permitted "limited intervention rights under FRBP 2018(a) in order that
they may provide the court with advice and information regarding the
effect on the rates of their particular constituencies of proposals
otherwise before the court in these proceedings."'' 42 While the court
allowed some parties to intervene, either generally or in a limited
manner, it failed to further define the concept of a "party-in-interest"
under Section 1109 or FRBP 2018.
The contrast between the court's treatment of the customer ratepayers
and its treatment of the Consumer Advocate and BIA is instructive. The
court, in examining the customer ratepayers' right to intervene, implied
that those ratepayers did not have a strong enough interest, financial or
otherwise, to be allowed to intervene themselves, at least not generally.
The Consumer Advocate and the BIA, both of whom represented the
interests of various ratepayers, but did not appear to have a direct
financial stake themselves, were allowed limited intervention rights. By
139. Id. at 557. Compare this result with that in In re Addison Community Hospital Authority, in
which the court declined the request of a citizen's group to intervene in proceedings regarding the
plan of reorganization. 175 B.R. 646, 650 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1994). In denying the request, the
court found the citizen's group to be "merely interested" in the bankruptcy proceedings without a
"direct legal interest" in the proceedings. Id. at 650. The court seemed particularly concerned with
judicial efficiency, noting that it would not want to allow all citizens in the area to participate in the
proceedings. Id. at 650 ("By allowing a large number of non-creditors to be heard in this action, the
Court would be granting a blanket invitation to all parties in the area serviced by Addison. This
would hamper, and unduly delay, the debt adjustment process.").
140. In re Pub. Serv. 88 B.B. at 555. Compare this result with that in In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc.,
101 B.R. 844 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989). In Ionosphere, the court denied a right to intervene for a
general consumers' rights organization in an airline bankruptcy. It distinguished the Public Service
case because in Ionosphere the consumer advocacy group was general, rather than organized to
represent these particular consumers and, thus, lacked the expertise factor. Id. at 851. According to
the Ionosphere court, "The real party in interest is the party that has the legal right which is sought
to be enforced or is the party entitled to bring suit." Id. at 849. The court was concerned over the
possibility of a group claiming to represent consumers (as opposed to the consumers themselves)
interfering in a bankruptcy proceeding and that "[o]verly lenient standards may potentially over-
burden the reorganization process by allowing numerous parties to interject themselves into the case
on every issue, thereby thwarting the goal of a speedy and efficient reorganization." Id. at 849, 850
(citing Roslyn Sav. Bank v. Comcoach Corp. (In re Comcoach Corp.), 698 F.2d 571, 574 (2d Cir.
1983) and In re Pub. Serv., 88 B.R. at 554).
141. In re Pub. Serv., 88 B.R. at 557.
142. Id.
Vol. 82:75, 2007
Keeping the Faith
implication, therefore, the court found that a direct financial interest is
neither absolutely necessary, nor by itself sufficient, to create an
automatic right to participate in a bankruptcy proceeding.
The same court had another opportunity to define party-in-interest in
a later opinion in the same bankruptcy, In re Public Service Co. of New
Hampshire (Public Service i).143 As had happened earlier, a state
attorney general (this time, from Massachusetts), and a variety of citizen
organizations sought to intervene. The proceeding involved a proposal
by the debtor to reorganize the ownership structure of the company.
144
Though the court recognized that the parties seeking to intervene may
have had a variety of noneconomic motives for intervention, 45 it also
noted that each had economic concerns as well. 146 In the end, the court
concluded that the parties could intervene in the case without the need to
determine whether a financial concern was necessary for intervention.
147
However, though the court conceded that the parties had brought forth
financial considerations, the court did not indicate whether the parties
seeking intervention (or even the parties represented by them) would
themselves be financially affected. Rather the court merely noted that
whether "this action if approved [will] lead to the possibility of a
diminution in the value of the assets of this estate" is a financial
question.1 48 Interestingly, in Public Service II, the court seemed to favor
a broad standard, consistent with its prior opinion, that the court may
hear from any party that may be able to help in the proceeding. 49 The
court did not temper that broad standard in light of any potential
financial interests.
The two Public Service decisions provide little guidance on what to
do with customers; the cases clearly establish that general intervention is
not appropriate, but fail to indicate whether potential financial impact on
customers is either necessary or sufficient to provide a right to intervene
in a limited way in specific matters.
143. 90 B.R. 575 (Bankr. N. H. 1988).
144. Id. at 576.
145. Id. at 579.
146. Id. at 580.
147. Id. at 580.
148. Id. at 580.
149. Id. at 579 ("The reorganization court I believe has sufficient discretion to 'hear' any entity at
any hearing to the extent that the entity may be able to provide an aid to the court in understanding
the matter before it.").
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In many ways, parishioners are similar to customers in the bankruptcy
scheme. Like customers, they are not necessarily owed anything by the
debtor-the primary impact may be in the future. Just as customers may
be able to do business with other companies-if there are other
companies-with no financial downside, parishioners are permitted to
exercise their faith regardless of contribution (or lack thereof) to the
church. But there are also differences between parishioners and business
customers. Unlike customers, parishioners often do not have the ability
to simply choose another business ("church") to attend and, if desired, to
contribute to (at least not absent a change in religious faith). In addition,
unlike utility companies which are heavily regulated by the government,
churches-and particularly their relationships with their "customers"-
are subject to minimal state intervention. Thus, while utility customers'
interests may be protected in other ways, parishioners may not be so
fortunate.1 50  Parishioners' concerns in their church's bankruptcy
proceedings extend beyond mere finances. Though cases like Public
Service I and II indicate that parishioners should not be permitted to
intervene generally in all bankruptcy proceedings of their churches, there
may be particular situations where the effect on parishioners justifies
limited intervention. Such limited intervention would allow parishioners
to present their interests in proceedings which directly affect those
interests without overburdening the bankruptcy courts with additional
parties and arguments when not necessary to ensure protection of those
interests.
2. Potential Property Owners
15 1
Bankruptcy proceedings deal with property rights, 152 and naturally
anyone with a potential right to the property at issue will seek to protect
that right in the bankruptcy proceeding. However, merely having an
150. This is an issue of adequate representation in the bankruptcy, rather than of whether the
customer or parishioner is interested in the proceedings. Interestingly, unlike FRCP 24, FRBP 2018
does not include a requirement that the interested party's interests not be represented in the
bankruptcy.
151. In an adversary proceeding, FRCP 24(a)(2) provides that property ownership may create a
mandatory right of intervention. With a bankruptcy case, property ownership itself is not being used
to create a right to intervene, but rather to establish either "party-in-interest" status that will allow
for mandatory intervention under section 1109 or "interested party" status under FRBP 2018.
152. Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 447 (2004) (finding that discharge of
a debt by a bankruptcy court is an in rem proceeding).
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interest in the property, or being financially impacted as a result of the
property distribution, may not suffice to establish party-in-interest status.
Two cases from the New York bankruptcy courts analyze intervention
by parties claiming rights in property of the bankruptcy estate. The
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York refused to
permit intervention in the bankruptcy proceeding of a shopping store
tenant where the putative intervenor was "merely 'concerned' with the
results of the proceeding." 153 The putative intervenor, a clothing store,
attempted to intervene when the debtor-tenant sought to assign its lease
to another clothing store in violation of the shopping-center-mix
provisions of its lease. 154 The court denied the putative intervenor's
motion to intervene because the shopping-center-mix provisions were
intended to protect the landlord, not other tenants. 55 Thus, the putative
intervenor had no legally protectable interest to claim. 56 In so holding,
the court noted that creditors of creditors do not have a right to intervene
in bankruptcy cases because, while the bankruptcy may affect them
financially, the relationship is too tenuous to create a right to
intervene.1
57
Three years later, the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of
New York permitted intervention by a party claiming ownership of
property. 158 The debtor, a professional sports photographer, sued the
National Basketball Association (NBA) for the return of photographs
shot by the debtor. He then reopened his bankruptcy case to determine
the effect of the photographs on the bankruptcy proceeding. 59 The NBA
sought to participate in the bankruptcy proceeding.' 60  The court
permitted the NBA to intervene, finding that it had "an actual, direct
153. In re Martin Paint Stores, 199 B.R. 258, 264 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing In re Goldman,
82 B.R. 894, 896 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988)).
154. Id. at 260-61.
155. Id. at 264.
156. Id. at 265.
157. Id. at 264. Not all courts agree, however, that one who is a creditor of a creditor cannot be a
party-in-interest. See In re Cowan, 235 B.R. 912 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1999). In Cowan, the debtor had
filed a prior bankruptcy, and the court acknowledged that the creditors of the original bankruptcy
were, in essence, now creditors of the bankruptcy trustee from the original bankruptcy. Id. at 915.
Even though the creditors could now be classified as creditors-of-creditors in the debtor's
subsequent bankruptcy proceeding, the court permitted intervention to allow the creditors to allege
that the debtor had filed a second bankruptcy in bad faith. Id. at 915, 918.
158. In re Koch, 229 B.R. 78, 82 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1999).
159. Id. at 79.
160. Id. at 81.
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interest in this bankruptcy case inasmuch as it claims to be the owner of
property which the Debtor claims belongs to his bankruptcy estate."'
' 61
In both of these cases, the potential intervenor sought to protect a
financial interest. But financial interest alone is not necessarily sufficient
to create party-in-interest status in the bankruptcy proceeding as is an
ownership interest in property allegedly belonging to the bankruptcy
estate.
3. Conclusions on Party-in-Interest Status
When determining whether an unnamed party is a party-in-interest
under section 1109 or an interested party under FRBP 2018, a court
should consider whether the party will be financially or legally affected
by the proceeding, but may also consider whether the party's
participation is necessary to protect its interests and the effect of
intervention on judicial efficiency.1 62 Because of the vast universe of
potential issues in one bankruptcy case, it is impossible to conclude that
a parishioner would always qualify (or not qualify) for intervention
under section 1109 and FRBP 2018.
D. Permissive and Mandatory Intervention in Adversary Proceedings
FRBP 7024 applies FRCP 24 to adversary proceedings which, in turn,
includes both mandatory and permissive intervention provisions.
1 63
Intervention is mandatory when dictated by statute or when the
intervenor's interest in property may be "impair[ed] or impede[d]" by
the resolution of the matter.' 64 Intervention is permissive when dictated
by statute or when the intervenor shares a "claim or defense" in common
161. Id. at 82.
162. In re Addison Cmty. Hosp. Auth., 175 B.R. 646, 651 (Bankr. E.D. Miss. 1994) (citing In re
City of Bridgeport, 128 B.R. 686, 687 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991)) (also weighing an additional factor:
a party's need to intervene in order to ensure that the case does not set precedent that may adversely
affect that party in future cases); In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 101 B.R. 844, 853 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1989); In re Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H., 88 B.R. 546, 551 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1988)); see also In re First
Interregional Equity Corp., 218 B.R. 731, 736 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1997) (citing In re Torrez, 132 B.R.
924, 936 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1991)); In re City of Bridgeport, 128 B.R. at 687-88; In re Ionosphere,
101 B.R. at 853.
163. Cindy Vreeland, Public Interest Groups, Public Law Litigation, and Federal Rule 24(a), 57
U. CHI. L. REv. 279, 282 (1990).
164. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2).
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with one involved in the adversary proceeding.1 65 In short, even without
an express statute granting intervention to a particular party, intervention
is proper when the intervenor has an interest in the property at issue
which stands to be harmed or an issue in common with the proceeding in
which the party seeks to intervene.
An express right to intervene in an adversary proceeding may be
conferred by statute. 166 However, the Code never mentions parishioners.
Thus, to the extent that parishioners seek to intervene as of right in an
adversary proceeding, FRCP 24 implies that they can do so only when
they have an unrepresented property interest.167 Mandatory intervention
has been interpreted to require a showing of an interest that is "direct,
substantial, and legally protectable."
1 68
E. Necessity of a Substantial and Unrepresented Interest in the
Bankruptcy Case
Regardless of whether a parishioner seeks mandatory or permissive
intervention, or whether the proceeding is an adversary proceeding or a
case, the parishioner must establish an "interest" in the case. 169 Under
165. FED. R. Civ. P. 24. The common claim or defense provides an interesting contrast to the
intervention provisions of FRBP 2018 and section 1109. In those other intervention provisions, a
party with a common interest is not permitted to intervene if the parties currently involved in the
proceeding can adequately represent that interest. FRCP 24's permissive intervention provision,
however, is designed with judicial efficiency in mind. 32B AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts § 2153
(2005). The intervenor may be permitted to intervene precisely because of its common interest. Id.
But that common interest must be rooted in a "claim or defense," implying that the potential
intervenor must also be involved in separate litigation. Unless the parishioners are also involved in
litigation that would invoke a common claim or defense, such a provision will not be of use. In
determining whether a party should be permitted to participate, the court must ensure that such
participation will not create an excessive burden on the proceedings themselves, such that the
intervention is not justified. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(2).
166. See FED. R. Civ. P. 24.
167. This language arises out of FRCP 24's mandatory intervention provisions, which allow
intervention when another statute so requires (this only applies in the church bankruptcy context if
section 1109 is construed to require intervention for parishioners as parties-in-interest in adversary
proceedings) or "when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which
is the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a
practical matter impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest, unless the
applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties." FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2).
168. In re Kaiser Steel Corp., 998 F.2d 783, 790 (10th Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. Perry
County Bd. of Educ., 567 F.2d 277, 279 (5th Cir. 1978)).
169. See 11 U.S.C. § 1109 (2000) (requiring demonstration of party-in-interest status for
intervention); FED. R. BANKR. P. 2018 (requiring demonstration of interested party status for
intervention); FED. R. Civ. P. 24 (requiring showing of interest in property to allow intervention
Washington Law Review
FRBP 2018, the parishioner would also need to establish "cause" to
intervene; under FRCP 24, the parishioner must demonstrate that the
intervention is needed to protect his or her interests in the property at
issue. And, because parishioners are not expressly listed as a party-in-
interest under Section 1109, mandatory intervention is only available
when they establish an interest mandating a right to participate. Thus,
regardless of which rule a court uses, it appears that a parishioner's best
chance for intervention lies in establishing a significant and unprotected
interest in the decision to be rendered in the proceedings.
The parishioners do have an "interest" in the bankruptcy cases of their
churches. Their interest in practicing their faith is significant-indeed,
constitutionally protected. 170 The parishioners may also have prospective
financial interests if donations are required to keep the church
functioning after distributions are made to creditors. These are
significant interests that should support intervention. An interest alone,
however is not sufficient for intervention; that interest must also be
unprotected.
The Spokane bankruptcy case provides insight on how claims for
parishioner intervention might be handled. i17 In that matter, the Tort
Claimants' Committee172 sought an order that it was entitled to intervene
in any adversary proceedings related to the bankruptcy case. The
Bankruptcy Court did not allow mandatory intervention, noting that the
Tort Claimants' Committee could protect its interests in other ways,
including objecting to proposed settlements of the adversary
absent statute mandating intervention). For discussion of FRCP 24's permissive intervention
provisions, see supra Part III.D.
170. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(c) (2000) (granting individuals
standing to sue the federal government for burdening the free exercise of religion).
171. Only the Portland bankruptcy court has expressly considered the issue of parishioner
intervention. Although the Portland bankruptcy court's opinion does not provide much detail on the
issue, the briefs filed by the parties consider it in more detail. Portland Memorandum in Support of
Motion to Intervene, supra note 12; Tort Claimants Committee's Response to Motions to Intervene
at 3, Tort Claimants' Comm. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland (In re Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Portland), Adv. Proc. No. 04-03292 (Bankr. D. Or. Feb. 28, 2005) ("[T]he Parish
Committee can never be anything other than a voice for Debtor's interests. Its intervention can add
nothing to these proceedings.").
172. The Tort Claimants' Committee differs from the Tort Litigants' Committee. The latter
committee includes those potential tort claimants who also have pending litigation in the bankruptcy
proceedings. Memorandum at 3, Tort Claimants' Comm. v. Catholic Diocese of Spokane (In re
Catholic Bishop of Spokane), B.A.P. Nos. EW-05-1273-NBS & EW-05-1276--NBS (B.A.P. 9th
Cir. Sept. 6, 2006) (unpublished opinion on file with author) [hereinafter Spokane Memorandum
Opinion].
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proceedings. 7 3 The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) 17 4 reversed,
holding that the Tort Claimants' Committee's interests were not
adequately represented and, thus, intervention would be permitted.1
7 5
The BAP noted that the adversary proceedings could have a significant
impact on what property would be part of the estate eligible for
distribution to creditors, and that the Tort Claimants' Committee
membership could be harmed as a result. 
76
Perhaps the most enlightening section of the BAP's opinion, and an
indication of how the Ninth Circuit might react to a petition to intervene
by parishioners, comes in the discussion of whether the Tort Litigants'
Committee could or would adequately represent the interests of the Tort
Claimants' Committee. The Spokane Diocese argued that the Tort
Litigants and the Tort Claimants shared a common interest-to
maximize the estate for the benefit of the creditors. But the BAP was not
convinced, requiring a very strong showing of adequate representation to
deny intervention:
In this Circuit, "in determining whether an applicant's interest is
adequately represented by existing parties, we consider: (1)
whether the interest of a present party is such that it will
undoubtedly make all of the intervenor's arguments; (2) whether
the present party is capable and willing to make such arguments;
and (3) whether the would-be intervenor would offer any
necessary elements to the proceedings that other parties would
neglect.". . . The proposed intervenor need only show that the
representation "may be" inadequate. 1
77
The court noted that the two committees both sought to maximize the
estate, but disagreed on how the property of the estate should be
distributed once maximized. 78 Similarly, parishioners and their bishop
173. Id. at 4, 9.
174. Bankruptcy Appellate Panels, or "BAP"s, are established by 28 U.S.C. § 158 to hear
bankruptcy appeals with the consent of the parties involved in the appeal. Ordinarily, appeals from
the bankruptcy courts would be heard by the District Court. 28 U.S.C. § 158 (2000).
175. Spokane Memorandum Opinion, supra note 172, at 14.
176. Spokane Memorandum Opinion, supra note 172, at 9-10.
177. Spokane Memorandum Opinion, supra note 172, at 10-11 (emphasis added) (internal
citations omitted).
178. Spokane Memorandum Opinion, supra note 172, at 13. The court also cited "[tihe
record... [of] animosity, mistrust and ill will among certain members of the [Tort Claimant's
Committee] and the [Tort Litigants Committee]" in determining that the Tort Litigants' Committee
might not adequately represent the interests of the Tort Claimants' Committee. Presumably, this
would not be an issue between parishioners and their diocese. Id. at 12.
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share a common interest-maximization of the trust property. The
parties may differ, however, when the bishop assumes additional duties
as a debtor-in-possession. 179 In that case, the sole party to the case who
shared the parishioners' interests may no longer be able to protect those
interests.
As the courts continue to consider the various property-related issues
in the church bankruptcy proceedings, they must simultaneously weigh
the need for parishioners to intervene in those proceedings against the
need to ensure an efficient bankruptcy process. Parishioners are
interested parties when their churches file for bankruptcy protection.
Yet, allowing them to intervene in the bankruptcy proceedings may
increase the costs of the bankruptcy or delay the process. The courts are
left to determine an equitable solution that will best protect everyone's
interests.
IV. PARISHIONER INTERVENTION IN BANKRUPTCY
PROCEEDINGS
Parishioners should be allowed to intervene in both bankruptcy cases
and adversary proceedings when they have a substantial interest in the
property that the diocese cannot adequately represent. Parishioners do
not need to intervene in proceedings where the only issue is ownership
of church property and the diocese has already argued that the property
belongs to the parishes. Parishioners have a substantial interest in
ownership of church property; the property of the church ensures
parishioners a means to practice their faith. 180 Further, parishioners may
have a financial interest if additional funds are required of them in order
to continue their parish's existence. In the typical case, the diocese
adequately represents these interests. However, parishioners must be
allowed to intervene in proceedings that determine how church property
is distributed where the diocese, acting as debtor-in-possession, fails to
represent parishioners' interests.
179. See infra Part IV.B.
180. Portland Memorandum in Support of Motion to Intervene, supra note 12, at 2 ("Those in the
parish communities... use these parish properties for religious worship, the baptism of their
children, the education of their youth, the marriage of their young people and the burial of their
loved ones .... These places are integral to the exercise of religious practices that benefit others.").
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A. Intervention When the Diocese Seeks To Protect Its Parishioners'
Interests by Arguing that Property Is Held in Trust
When the diocese shares the viewpoint of its parishioners and, thus,
seeks to protect their interests, parishioners do not need to intervene in
the church's bankruptcy proceedings. Specifically, where the diocese
argues that it holds property in trust for its parishioners, the parishioners
interests are adequately protected. The intent of the donor may be
determinative of trust status. Although a variety of trust forms exist, the
two most common means of establishing trusts, "express trusts" and
"resulting trusts," both rely on a determination of donative intent.181 An
express trust is formed when the settlor of the trust expressly indicates
an intent that the transferred property be held in trust for the benefit of
another. 82 Although frequently written, an express trust may be created
orally or even by the settlor's conduct.' 83 With a resulting trust, the
intent that the transferred property be held in trust is presumed for the
settlor of the trust.
184
The Portland bankruptcy highlights the complexity of analyzing the
trust status of property belonging to the church. 8 5 Church funds,
whether for the Archdiocese or an individual parish, come largely from
donations. 186 Some funds are donated or raised with a specific purpose in
181. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 (2003) ("A trust ... is a fiduciary relationship
with respect to property, arising from a manifestation of intention to create that relationship and
subjecting the person who holds title to the property to duties to deal with it for the benefit of
charity or for one or more persons, at least one of whom is not the sole trustee."). For a further
discussion of trust issues regarding bankrupt churches, see Daniel J. Marcinak, Separation of
Church and Estate: On Excluding Parish Assets from the Bankruptcy Estate of a Diocese Organized
as a Corporation Sole, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 583 (2006).
182. 90 C.J.S. Trusts § 8 (2002) ("Express trusts are those which are created by the direct and
positive acts of the parties, by some writing, or deed, or will, or by words either expressly or
impliedly evincing an intention to create a trust." (footnotes omitted)); see also Portland
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Intervene, supra note 12, at 6; Spokane Memorandum
Decision, supra note 44, at 38 (noting that the Spokane Archdiocese's articles of incorporation
expressly stated that the Archdiocese held "property in trust for . . . the Roman Catholic Church"
and using that statement as an indication that, while an express trust existed, the parishes were not
the beneficiaries of that trust relationship); Gerstenblith, Civil Court, supra note 23, at 552.
183. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 13 cmt. b; GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT, TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEES § 45 (2d ed. rev. 1984).
184. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 7 cmt. a ("A resulting trust arises from an intention that
is legally attributed to a transferor based on the nature of the transaction, rather than from
manifested intent."); see also Spokane Memorandum Decision, supra note 44, at 39-42 (discussing,
but rejecting, equitable notion of constructive trust).
185. See supra Part L.A (discussing ownership issues raised in Portland bankruptcy).
186. Portland Memorandum in Support of Motion to Intervene, supra note 12, at 1.
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mind, such as building a new school or providing for the retirement of
clergy. For example, one parish in the Portland Archdiocese raised
almost two million dollars in pledges to build a church, of which seven
hundred fifty thousand dollars has been received and is frozen as a result
of the bankruptcy proceeding-the money cannot be used for the
building fund unless the bankruptcy court deems that it will not be used
to pay claims in the bankruptcy proceeding.' 87 The intent of those
donating funds for such a building project is clear: they wanted to build
a church. 188 Where donors give funds for a specific purpose, they likely
establish a trust relationship both under the law of most states 189 and in
canon law.190 Other funds, however, are not given for a specific purpose,
but rather for the general use of the church. 191
With such general funds, the issues become much more complex.
First, were the funds given "in trust" and, second, if they were given "in
trust," for what purpose was the trust developed? The Portland
Parishioners argue that all donations and funds raised are held in trust for
the individual parishes from which they came.192 But do parishioners
really give money to the church with the expectation that it will be used
exclusively for their own parish?
187. Wright, supra note 13. That parish is not alone; Wright mentions that almost $4 million was
put into capital improvement funds throughout the archdiocese. Id.; see also Tucson Disclosure
Statement, supra note 6, at 20 (indicating that each individual parish purchased its own land and
built its own church with its own funds).
188. Wright, supra note 13 (quoting parishioner and chairman of the building fund, stating that
"[a]ll we understand is that we gave money for a specific purpose, and now that money may not go
to build a church").
189. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2.
190. See 1983 CODE C. 1267 ("Offerings given by the faithful for a certain purpose can be applied
only for that same purpose.").
191. In the Tucson bankruptcy, the court documents indicate that donations not tied to specific
purposes, such as weekly offertory collections, were held by the Parishes until the Parish had
sufficient funds to cover three months' worth of general expenses; any funds greater than that
amount would be held by the Diocese. Tucson Disclosure Statement, supra note 6, at 21. However,
who holds legal title to the funds is not dispositive of equitable ownership of the funds.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2. Even if the individual parishes actually hold and control the
funds, they may still be considered diocesan property in a bankruptcy and, conversely, funds held
by the Diocese may still be held in trust for the individual parishes. See generally Tucson Disclosure
Statement, supra note 6, at 21 (arguing that Diocese holds "Unrestricted Deposits" in trust for
parishes).
192. Portland Memorandum in Support of Motion to Intervene, supra note 12, at 1. The court in
the Spokane bankruptcy also considered, but rejected, the argument that the very statute allowing
for the incorporation of the church automatically created a trust relationship between the church and
its parishioners. Spokane Memorandum Decision, supra note 44, at 35-36.
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The parishioners argue that their donative intent when supplying
money to their local parishes was that the parishes themselves retain the
benefit of the money. 193 However, this donative intent will likely fail to
meet the standard of intent required for an express, or even resulting,
trust.' 94 "The expression of a generally benevolent attitude or of a
general donative intent is not the equivalent of a trust intent."' 95
However, this rule does not mean that all parishioner donations and all
church properties are subject to the claims of bankruptcy creditors. 96
Indeed, there may be two levels of intent to consider. On the level of the
individual parishioner, an expression of intent regarding the donations is
sometimes expressly stated, such as with building drives or other
targeted donations. 197 Even if no such intent is evident on the parishioner
level, to the extent that property is turned over to the diocese by a parish,
the intent of the parish may be the relevant consideration. This is
particularly true if the parish is considered to be a separate legal entity.
Some money may be turned over with the intent that the diocese hold it
for the parish's benefit, while other funds may be provided for the
193. For example, multiple affidavits were filed in the Spokane case indicating the parishioners'
intention that the donated money be used for the benefit of the individual parishes. See, e.g.,
Affidavit of Monsignor James Ribble in Response to Summary Judgment (Cathedral of Our Lady of
Lourdes Parish) at 3, Comm. of Tort Litigants v. Catholic Diocese of Spokane (In re The Catholic
Bishop of Spokane), Adv. Proc. No. 05-80038 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. May 27, 2005) ("All money
collected in the regular Sunday collection is for the use, maintenance and improvement of Our Lady
of Lourdes."); Declaration of Jack O'Brien in Response to Summary Judgment (St. Peter's -
Spokane) at 2, Comm. of Tort Litigants (In re Bishop of Spokane), Adv. Proc. No. 05-80038 (May
27, 2005) ("Further, I have contributed to the Parish on a regular basis and it is my intent that my
contributions to the Parish go to the exclusive use of the Parish."); Affidavit of Linda Kobe-Smith in
Response to Summary Judgment (St. Ann's Parish, Spokane) at 2, Comm. of Tort Litigants (In re
Bishop of Spokane), Adv. Proc. No. 05-80038 (May 26, 2005) ("All money donated to St. Ann's
Parish through the weekly collections was for the direct use [sic] St. Ann's, for its benefit and
furtherance of St. Ann's charitable works, at St. Ann's sole discretion, not for use by the Diocese.").
194. Even if such an intent is found, money cannot be in a trust unless it is "traceable." See 5
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 129, 541.11. Assuming, however, that the archdiocese
separates gifts given for specific purposes from gifts given for general support of the parish, and that
each parish's gifts are accounted for separately, tracing should not present a problem.
195. BOGERT, supra note 183, § 46 (internal citations omitted).
196. But see Lipson, supra note 8, at 407 (arguing that "[i]f the Portland and Spokane cases are
any indication, the application of ordinary bankruptcy and state law would likely produce results
which parishioners would find troubling"). Lipson also discusses the history of trust law within the
churches, concluding that state trust law may prevent property from belonging to the diocese. Id. at
393-99.
197. But see Spokane Memorandum Decision, supra note 44, at 43 (distinguishing the
parishioners' intent that the money be used to build the building from the parishioners' intent as to
who would own the building).
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diocese's own use. The question of whether a trust has been formed
requires difficult determinations of intent; this is true whether the
question involves the possible formation of a trust when parishioners
donate money to the church, or when parishes subsequently turn over
that money to a diocese.98
As the courts make these determinations, they will need to consider
both the magnitude of the parishioner's interests and the parishioner's
need to be part of the proceedings in order to adequately represent their
interests. As noted above, the interests of the parishioners lie in being
able to use that property which is needed to fully practice their faith. The
need, however, to intervene to represent those interests is not as clear.
Although there may be situations in which the diocese and its parishes
and parishioners disagree over the ownership of property, the
parishioners in the Portland case expressly note that they agree with the
Archdiocese as to the ownership of the property in question.'99 The
parishioners do not claim that property listed by the Archdiocese as
titled in the Archdiocese actually belongs to the parishes. Rather, the
parishioners merely repeat the claims of the Archdiocese that the
Archdiocese's ownership is in trust for the parishes:
In this proceeding, the Committee of Parishioners will allege
that: (1) significant portions of the "Disputed Property" (as
defined in the Complaint) are not property of the estate under 11
U.S.C. § 541 because the Archdiocese holds only legal title to,
and not an equitable interest in, such property; (2) the members
and constituents of the Committee of Parishioners, and their
predecessors, donated significant portions of the Disputed
Property with intent that the property be dedicated to the
religious and charitable purposes of the parish and the parish
community, and that such donations and intentions create
charitable trusts enforceable under Oregon law; (3) the members
and constituents of the Committee of Parishioners are
beneficiaries of the charitable trusts mentioned above and
possess enforceable rights under Oregon law to enforce the
trust.
20 0
198. For an extensive analysis of intent and trusts in the context of churches, see Gerstenblith,
Civil Court, supra note 23, at 550-66.
199. Portland Memorandum in Support of Motion to Intervene, supra note 12, at 7 ("The
Archdiocese agrees that it holds only legal title and not the beneficial interest in the Disputed
Properties.").
200. Portland Memorandum in Support of Motion to Intervene, supra note 12, at 5.
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The Portland Complaint defines "Disputed Property" as "property that
Debtor does not consider to be property of the estate or that Debtor
contends [is] being held by Debtor for others.",20 1 When confronting the
issue of whether property will remain in the hands of the Church or go to
the creditors, the Church and its parishioners will typically agree that, to
the extent possible, property should remain with the Church.202 Although
the diocese and the parishioners present a common viewpoint in the
current adversary proceeding, the real dispute between the diocese and
its parishioners is not whether the property belongs to the estate, but
what happens to the property once taken out of the estate. That issue
does not need to be resolved yet, if ever, in the bankruptcy court.20 3
B. Intervention When the Diocese's Interests Conflict with Its
Parishioners Interests
Potential for future conflicts between the parishes and the dioceses
exists. When conflict arises between these two entities, the diocese may
not adequately represent the interests of its parishioners. In that case, the
parishioners should be allowed to intervene to protect their interests.
201. Portland Complaint, supra note 21, at 4.
202. The author recognizes that some parishioners, out of concern for the tort victims, may feel
differently but, in those circumstances, the parishioners should be adequately represented by the tort
claimants in the proceedings. Further, because such parishioners are seeking not to keep money for
themselves or their own purposes, they are not protecting their own property interests and would
thus not qualify for a significant interest under the intervention requirements.
203. The disputes over property between dioceses and their parishes will frequently involve
proceedings that arise after the adversary proceeding. For example, if the debtor diocese seeks a
preferential transfer recovery against one of its creditors, a contractor hired to build a new parish, it
will use an adversary proceeding to do so. But what becomes of the recovered funds? Are the funds
property of the diocesan estate (and, thus, the creditors)? Of the diocese itself? Of the parishioners?
Although the diocese and parishioners may disagree as to these matters, the parishioners may not
need to intervene in the adversary proceeding itself to protect their rights. The dispute has nothing to
do with whether the funds constitute a preferential transfer and can be recovered. Rather the dispute
is over who is entitled to the funds once recovered. The actual distribution of funds between the
diocese, for the benefit of the bankruptcy estate, and the parishioners is not an adversarial
proceeding, except to the extent that it affects the ability to confirm a reorganization plan or that the
parishioners are already party to the proceeding (such as when the estate seeks to "recover" the
assets from the individual parishes or parishioners who, at that point, are parties in the adversarial
proceeding and do not need to intervene). The parishioners may need to intervene, but the
intervention comes in the bankruptcy case under section 1109 and FRBP 2018, not in the adversary
proceeding under FRBP 7024.
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1. Disputes When the Diocese Refuses to Argue that State Law
Creates a Trust Relationship
With regard to property disputes between the diocese and its
individual parishes, the parishioners in Portland note that the issue of
whether canon or state law applies may arise.2 °4 If the Archdiocese
argues that state law is the source of its trust relationship, it may be
estopped in the future from arguing that canon law should be considered.
The Archdiocese may not be willing to make this argument, even if it
affects the trust status of its parishioners' property, for fear that the
precedent will harm it in the future. Although it is not clear that whether
canon law or state law is applied will produce different results, if there is
a possibility that the parishioners' interests in the property will be better
protected under state law, the parishioners should be allowed to
intervene to make that argument. To date, however, there has been no
refusal by the Archdiocese to make such an argument.20 5 Without an
indication that the canon law/state law argument will become important
to the case or that the argument will not be made by the Archdiocese, it
is premature for the parishioners to intervene.
2. Disputes When the Diocese Is Acting as Debtor-in-Possession
If during the bankruptcy case, a diocese becomes classified as a
debtor-in-possession, its new status may create a conflict between the
204. Although the parishioners anticipate arguing that state law may constitute the basis for the
trust relationship between the parishes and the diocese, the parishioners assume that the diocese will
not make the same arguments out of concern for the precedential effect of such decisions. Portland
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Intervene, supra note 12, at 10. Precedential effect is of
concern, as the Spokane bankruptcy court noted. Spokane Memorandum Decision, supra note 44, at
19-24. To the extent that a diocese makes an argument regarding property ownership in one case, it
may be prevented from making a different argument in a future case. Indeed, the tort claimants in
Portland indicated that prior decisions in which the Spokane diocese had claimed ownership rights
over parish property should prevent the Portland Archdiocese from arguing otherwise in the
bankruptcy proceeding. Portland Memorandum in Support of Motion to Intervene, supra note 12, at
10-11. The Spokane court, however, did not find sufficient inconsistency in the two arguments to
justify barring the Archdiocese from making such an argument. Spokane Memorandum Decision,
supra note 44, at 23-24. Had the court found otherwise, the parishioners would likely need to
intervene in order to make the argument regarding property ownership because there would be no
other party willing and able to make such an argument.
205. Moreover, no court has yet determined that state law will lead to a different result than canon
law, which also provides that the assets are held in a trust relationship. See Hayes, supra note 12, at
5; see also Roundtable Discussion, supra note 76, at 38 (comments of Mr. Phelan).
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legal duties of the diocese and the interests of its parishioners.2 °6 A
debtor-in-possession in Chapter 11 takes on most of the duties of a
trustee in Chapter 11,207 including the duties to care for the property of
the estate, 28 object to claims as needed, 9 file documents and reports, 21°
and put together a plan of reorganization. 21 ' The debtor-in-possession
has fiduciary duties as a result of its position.22 Although there is
substantial disagreement among the courts as to what this fiduciary duty
entails, it is clear that the duty is owed, at least in part, to creditors and
that it requires some protection of the assets of the bankruptcy estate for
the benefit of those creditors.1 3
206. Though by definition a "debtor-in-possession" refers to the debtor, 11 U.S.C. § 1101(1)
(2000), the two are quite distinct. See Theresa J. Pulley Radwan, Limitations on Assumption and
Assignment of Executory Contracts by "Applicable Law", 31 N.M. L. REV. 299, 304-10 (2001).
One of the key distinctions between a pre-bankruptcy debtor and a debtor-in-possession in
bankruptcy are the unique duties of the debtor-in-possession. A debtor, whether in possession or
not, must provide information to the court and appear at hearings as required by the Bankruptcy
Code. II U.S.C. § 521. Section 521 of the Code was substantially revised in 2005 to include
additional duties, primarily involving additional documentation to be provided by the debtor. A
debtor-in-possession also takes on duties under § 1107. For a discussion of how the conflicting
duties of bishop and debtor-in-possession may lead to questions regarding appointment of a trustee,
see Lipson, supra note 8, at 400-02.
207. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a).
208. Id. § 704(2), made applicable to Chapter II by id. § 1106(a)(l).
209. Id. § 704(5), made applicable to Chapter II by id. § 106(a)(1).
210. Id. § 704(7)-(9), made applicable to Chapter II by id. § 1 I06(a)(1); see also id.
§ 1106(a)(6).
211. Id. § 1106(a)(5), (7).
212. C. R. Bowles & John Egan, The Sale of the Century or a Fraud on Creditors?: The
Fiduciary Duty of Trustees and Debtors in Possession Relating to the "Sale" of a Debtor's Assets
in Bankruptcy, 28(2) U. MEM. L. REV. 781, 788 (1998) ("It is beyond all speculation that a [debtor-
in-possession] managing the affairs of a bankruptcy estate is a fiduciary.").
213. Id. at 787-96. Bowles and Egan note that cases disagree as to whether the fiduciary duties of
a debtor-in-possession are owed solely to creditors of the bankrupt company or also to other entities
(focusing primarily on shareholders), id. at 789-91, and whether those duties simply mirror
common-law duties placed on directors of corporations or whether some extra duties are imposed
once bankruptcy begins, id. at 792-95. Regardless, it is clear that some duties are owed to creditors,
and that those duties at least include the basic duties owed to shareholders at common law, namely
the duties of good faith and of loyalty. See id. at 795 ("it clearly requires the [debtor-in-possession]
to place the interest of the bankruptcy estate above its own interest"). Interestingly, while Bowles
and Egan note that "the Code has sufficient protective mechanisms to ensure compliance" with
these fiduciary duties, id. at 795, the compliance measures relied upon by Bowles and Egan include
the ability to replace the debtor-in-possession with a trustee, 11 U.S.C. § 1104 (1994), or to dismiss
the case altogether or convert it into another chapter, II U.S.C. § 1112 (1994). Bowles & Egan,
supra note 191, at 795 n.67. The use of a trustee, either in a Chapter II case or in a Chapter 7 case
after conversion, is fraught with constitutional issues, leaving it at least conceivable that the only
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Given these fiduciary duties to creditors of the reorganizing entity, it
is conceivable that the diocese serving as a debtor-in-possession will
need to put the interests of creditors ahead of the interests of its
parishioners.1 4 This necessity would create a conflict between the
diocese and its parishioners. For example, if the diocese agrees to a
settlement with creditors requiring the sale of some of its church-run
schools, those parishes with schools that will close may have a property
interest in the schools that is counter to the settlement proposed by the
diocese. Yet, such closings may be necessary to offer the payments to
creditors that are required for an effective bankruptcy reorganization.
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Likewise, if the diocese chooses to change the territorial boundaries of
the individual parishes in its plan of reorganization to ensure more
efficient governance, the interests of the diocese may again be at odds
with the interests of the parishioners who will need to change churches,
perhaps against their will. In each of these situations, the diocese may
feel that the modifications are necessary for a successful reorganization,
while parishioners will wish to protect their interests in the
reorganizations. Parishioners would not have the legal right outside of
bankruptcy to prevent a Catholic school from closing or to stop the
redistricting of the church boundaries.216 However, outside of
bankruptcy, the church has more freedom to make its own decisions
under the constraints of canon law, which presumes that the diocese acts
in the interest of the church and those it serves. 217 Within bankruptcy,
remedy for a church-debtor-in-possession's failure to fulfill its fiduciary duties will be to remove
the case from bankruptcy altogether. See Lipson, supra note 8, at 400-02.
214. Portland Memorandum in Support of Motion to Intervene, supra note 12, at 10 ("It is very
possible that the Archdiocese's fiduciary obligations will conflict with the interests of the
Committee of Parishioners and its members."). However, Bowles and Egan note that in some cases,
fiduciary duties may run to corporate shareholders. Bowles & Egan, supra note 212, at 791 (citing
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 355 (1985)). If parishioners
resemble shareholders within a corporation, perhaps the fiduciary duties of the diocesan debtor-in-
possession also run to the parishioners. However, even in the language cited by Bowles and Egan,
the court noted that shareholders have claims against the estate, which may provide a distinction
between shareholders and parishioners. Id. at 792.
215. Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code envisions a process of creating a plan of reorganization
that will be voted on by creditors. To the extent that classes of creditors reject the plan, which
presumably creditors who receive little or nothing under the plan will do, the plan must be approved
by the court over the objection of the creditors. I I U.S.C. §§ 1121-1129.
216. See Lipson, supra note 8, at 386-87 (discussing case law allowing the church to determine
the continuation or discontinuation of individual parishes) (citing St. Peter's Roman Catholic Parish
v. Urban Redevelopment Auth., 146 A.2d 724, 726 (Pa. 1958)).
217. 1983 CODEc.381,§ I &383,§3.
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those interests may succumb to the interests of creditors. In such
situations, parishioners should be recognized as parties-in-interest,
allowed mandatory intervention, or at least as interested parties, who
should be permitted to intervene to protect their otherwise unprotected
interests. This ability to intervene in limited situations when the
parishioners do not have another party to represent their interest would
equate to the limited intervention right presented in the Public Service
cases. However, the likelihood that some of the diocesan debtor-in-
possession's duties will conflict with the diocesan debtor's canon law
duties to parishioners should not create a carte blanche right for
parishioners to intervene in every aspect of the church's bankruptcy
proceeding.
CONCLUSION
Parishioners have important interests in the bankruptcy
reorganizations of their churches. Even if their interests are not financial,
they have an interest in being able to adequately practice their faith.
Although one can have belief without buildings, for many Catholics, the
ability to fully practice their faith includes the ability to send their
children to religious schools, to gather for services in a building
dedicated to that purpose, or to have funds available to support church
218projects. In most situations, the interests of the diocese are aligned
with those of its parishioners, for the bishop has a duty under canon law
to support the ecclesiastic functions of the church. However, as a debtor-
in-possession in bankruptcy, the diocese also has a fiduciary duty to the
creditors of the church. Undoubtedly, those interests will sometimes
conflict. In these situations, courts should allow parishioners to intervene
in the bankruptcy proceedings to ensure that their interests are protected.
Absent such a conflict of interest between the diocese and the parishes,
intervention would only add more parties to already complicated
bankruptcy proceedings.
Perhaps the best solution for resolving the property dispute between
parishes, the diocese, and claimants of those entities has already been
discovered and does not involve parishioner intervention at all. In the
Tucson bankruptcy, the Plan of Reorganization proposes that the
Archdiocese incorporate each parish separately under state law, allowing
218. See Hayes, supra note 12, at 3.
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each parish to hold title to its own property.219 Such incorporation would
not harm parishioners, who would be unlikely to notice a practical
difference in their parish.2 0 Although not a perfect solution,22' such an
arrangement would begin to resolve the property disputes.
219. Tucson Debtor's Plan of Reorganization, supra note 73, at 48-49. See also Roundtable
Discussion, supra note 76, at 40-41 (discussing corporate structures of non-Catholic churches and
potential for different results); Felicia Anne Nadbomy, Note, "Leap of Faith " into Bankruptcy: An
Examination of the Issues Surrounding the Valuation of a Catholic Diocese's Bankruptcy Estate, 13
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 839, 861 (2005) (considering alternative corporate structures for the
church).
220. Tucson Debtor's Plan of Reorganization, supra note 73, at 48-49.
221. Though the issues are beyond the scope of this Article, substantive consolidation and the
doctrine of piercing the veil may present significant problems to the parishes seeking to protect
themselves by incorporation. See Roundtable Discussion, supra note 76, at 35, 39 (comments of
Prof. Laycock); Lipson, supra note 8, at 390-92 (discussing possibility of "substantive
consolidation") and 389 (discussing Prof. Manny's suggestions that the church organize in such a
manner prior to the bankruptcy cases). The concept of substantive consolidation mirrors the idea of
piercing the corporate veil in the for-profit context, whereby a company can be held liable for the
debts of a separate company when the two companies are found to have a sufficiently close
relationship. Professor Lipson identifies a number of considerations for substantive consolidation
focusing on the relationship between the parties, the appearance to outsiders, and necessity. Id. at
391. These mirror the considerations for piercing the corporate veil in the business context. See Sea-
Land Servs., Inc. v. The Pepper Source, 941 F.2d 519, 520 (7th Cir. 1991) (focusing on lack of
separation between companies and apparent sanctioning of "fraud or [I injustice" (quoting Van
Dom Co. v. Future Chem. & Oil Corp., 753 F.2d 565, 569-70 (7th Cir. 1985))).
Even if the parishes are considered separate corporate entities, the question of intermingled parish
and diocesan property does not end. Parent, subsidiary, and sister corporations may be held
responsible for each other's debts when equity so requires. A state law corporate structure may not
shield the Church from extensive liability if the corporate veil is pierced. See, e.g., Melissa
Coulombe Beauchesne, Note, Corporate Law: Doe v. Gelineau, 732 A.2d 43 (1999), 5 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 683 (2000) (discussing Doe v. Gelineau, 732 A.2d 43 (1999), a case
involving piercing in the context of a Roman Catholic Church); see also Roundtable Discussion,
supra note 76, at 35 (comments of Nancy Peterman). The law and literature surrounding piercing
the corporate veil is extensive, but a few factors predominate, particularly commingling of funds
and failure to operate at arms-length. In Tucson's bankruptcy, for example, the parishes loaned
money to the Diocese that the Diocese then used to settle outstanding tort claims. In addition, the
parishes turned over excess collections to the Diocese for investment. Tucson Disclosure Statement,
supra note 6, at 26. In each case, the Diocese was to pay back the loans/deposits, with a .75%
interest rate. Id. at 22. However, the Diocese failed to make the required payments to the Parishes,
id. at 26, presenting two possible problems. First, the .75% interest rate is substantially lower than
traditional loan interest rates, indicating a lack of arms-length dealing between the parishes and the
diocese. Second, the failure of the parish to enforce its repayment rights further indicates a lack of
separation between the Diocese and its parishes. The Tort Claimants in the Spokane bankruptcy
alluded to possible veil piercing if the parishes were deemed to be separate legal entities. Committee
of Tort Litigants' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment, Comm. of Tort Litigants v. The Catholic Bishop of Spokane (In re The
Catholic Bishop of Spokane), Adv. Proc. No. 05-80038, at 20 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. Apr. 7, 2005).
